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VESSELS: OWNERSHIP, CHARTER, AND SERVICEa
THE "HAELEN"
June 28, 1918
(2 Entscheidungen des Oberprisengerichts in Berlin, 177)

In the prize matter concerning the Belgian steamer
.Haelen, home port Antwerp, the imperial superior prize
·court in Berlin, in its session of June 28, 1918, decided:
The appeal against the judgment of the imperial prize
-court in Kiel of March 13, 1918, is dismissed with costs.
Reasons: The Belgian steamer Haelen, en route from t hstatement
or
e facts.
Montreal to Rotterdam, .was brought to on November 3,
1917, by a German submarine within the German barred
·zone in the North Sea, and br<;>ught in to Swinemunde
for closer examination. Seizure in prize ensued on November 26, 1917, through authorized agents of the
·admiralty staff. The vessel had a cargo of wheat for the
Commission for Relief in Belgium, consigned to Rotterdam, and 'vas possessed of a safe conduct pass, from the Safe conduct.
Swiss cbnsul general in Montreal, which assures safe
·passage to vessels sailing to the account of the Commission for Relief in Belgium. A condition that the vessels
·shall take a course outside of the barred zones is adjoined
to the privilege; otherwise they lose the right to claim
:special treatment.
11 At the meeting of the International Conference on Maritime Law in 1922 the leading
·maritime countries of the world were represented. The matter of the status of state•
·owned and state-charted vessels was considered, and the following resolution was unanimously adopted:
1. Sovereign states, in regard to ships owned or operated by them and cargo owned by
•them, and cargo and passengers carried in such ships, ought to accept all liabilities to the
·same extent as a private owner.
2. Except in the case of the ships and cargoes mentioned in paragraph 3, such liabilities
·should be enforceable by the tribunals having jurisdiction over and by the procedure
· applicable to a privately owned ship or cargo or the owner thereof.
3. In the case of(a) Ships of war; (b) other vessels owned or operated by the Sovereign State and em-ployed only in governmental noncommercial work; (c) state-owned cargo carried only
1or the purpose of governmental noncommercial work in ships owned or operated by
the soverign state.
Such liabilities should be enforceable only by the like tribunals but only of the state
·b y which the ships is owned or operated, and should be enforceable by action in per
3onam against such state, and in addition, by any other form of procedure permitted by
.the law of such state.
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Claim " :- as raised by the o\\rners of the Ilaelen for the
release of the ship and indemnity, also for loss of freight;
and by the Commission for Relief in Belgi urn for the release of the cargo or for compensation. 'fhe claim 'vas
based on the ground that the vessel, being intrusted 'vith
a philanthropic mission, according to article 6c of the
Prize Code, was not subject to capture.
Judgment
of
B Y th e JU
· dgmen t of t h e prize
· court at K"1el of M arch
Kiel prize court.
13, 1918, the claims 'vere dismissed, and the condemnation of the vessel and its cargo decreed. The prize court
adopted the opinion that the premises of article 6c of
the Prize Code did apply to the vessel, but that the
privilege arising therefrom had been forfeited because
the vessel, in addition to its philanthropic mission, had
pursued other purposes in the war area for the benefit
of our enemy, and had for this reason traversed the
barred zone.
Against this judgment, both claimants have appealed~
Whereas the owners have maintained their claims, as
made in the first instance, the representative of the second claimant explained in the oral proceedings before
the court of appeal that the niaj or portion of the cargo
of wheat of the Commission for R.elief in Belgium had
b~en refunded in kind. 'fhe claim was therefore only
to be retained on behalf of the re1nainder of the cargor
Reimbursement is demanded for the value of the -wheat
in Canada, 'vith the addition of freight and expenses to
Europe. The claimants assert that it was only the bad
'veather "\vhich necessitated the captain's departure
from the prescribed course. In the zone traversed, there
had been neither occasion for any investigation in the
interest of the enemy, nor intention on the part of the
captain. In the court of second instance, a deposition,
made under oath by the captain of the Haelen before the
district court in Rotterdam, is presented, in 'vhich the
allegations made the basis of the appeal a.re corroborated.
The imperial commissioner before the superior court
has moved that the appeals n1ay be dismissed.
In the decision from 'vhich appeal is. made, the judge
of first instance goes upon the assumption that the
steamer Ilaelen, as incontestably enemy-o,Yned, 'vas subject to capture unless the protection of article 6c of the
Prize Code is to be accorded it. The latter 'vould follo'v
of necessity, if the vessel, in the prosecution of the voy-

THE HAELEN

age in question, '\Vas charged with a. philanthropic mission. m~~~~~th r opic
The prize court assents to this proposition, provided that
the sole purpose of the I-Iaelen was to convey a cargo of
wheat to Rotterdam for the Commssion for Relief in
Belgium, which would inure to the benefit of the civil
population of Belgian and French occupied territory. It
further assumes that by the mere fact of having traversed
the war zone, the ship did not forfeit the protection of war zone.
article 6c of the Prize Code, because the proclamation
of a part of the North Sea as a blockaded area made
no change in the prize provisions, and, specifically,
created no new grounds for seizure in prize. The vessel
only· forfeited the protection of aTticle 6c of the Prize
Code if in addition to its declared philanthropic mission,
it '\Vas pursuing other purposes in traversing the barred
zone, especially if it intended to collect certain information for the enemy. That such was the intention of the
captain of the Haelen in the present case, the judge of
first instance regards as proved on the basis of the ascertained facts, "rithout, however, specifying what definite
belligerent purpose the vessel vras pursuing by its voyage through the war zone. His main argument is that
it is not evident what other reason could have induced
the captain to expose his vessel to the great danger involved in traversing the barred zone, as his statement
that he was forced to do so on account of heavy weather
assumed, in view of the ascertained condition of the
"reather, the guise of a pure evasion; just as his behavior
after the capture revealed his conscious guilt.
'l'he imperial superior prize court can not join in these
considerations. It may be conceded to the judge of
first instance that if the captain of the Haelen intended
to assist the enemy's conduct of the '\var, his vessel '\Vould
have lost the protection of article 6c of the Prize Code
on this ground alone. But sufficient basis for such a
conclusion is not given.
The statements of the captain are certainly not cal- Deviation tram
culated to justify the voyage of the vessel. He may in course.
truth have had sufficient reason for not making his '\vay
north of the Faroe Islands, as had been prescribed, for
othenvise he '\vould have exposed his vessel to the full .
lateral force of the northwesterly storm, which manifestly prevailed at the time he approached the Faroe
Islands. The vessel '\vas not very seaworthy in heavy
weather, and was listing badly besides. But the situation

4

VESSELS : 0\VNER.SHIP, CHARTER, AND SERVICE

changed \Vhen he reached the southern point of the Faroe
Islands. With the diminishing \Vind it \Vas now possible
to steer to the northeast under the protection afforded by
the islands to the northwest, and thus even now avoid the
barred zone. For, as the map with the records sho,vs,
there is between the southern point of the Faroe Islands
and the edge of the barred area an adequate passage
open to traffic. In neglecting to take this route, and even
()n the follo\ving day making no attempt to get out of the
barred zone by a northerly course, but, on the contrary,
continuing his course from the southern tip of the Faroe
Islands in an easterly and southeasterly direction, the
captain \vas no longer compelled by necessity so to do,
but was acting according to his voluntary decision. The
motive behind this, ho\vever, does not need to be regarded
in the light of espionage, \Vhich under the circumstances
is highly improbable. A much more proximate cause \Vas
the wish to shorten the voyage, and the southern tip of
the Faroe Islands once reached, to avoid the circuitous
route around the war zone, undesired from the beginning
on account of the condition of the vessel. In another case,
the captain of a relief ship met in the barred zone frankly
gave as the reason for his course of action that he thought
he "\vould get by once again." A sirnilar thought may
have determined the captain in this case. Looked at
from this point of vie\v, the subsequent conduct of the
captain is explained. For, after he had, by his inconsiderate act, exposed the vessel intrusted to hin1 to the
Suspicious con- serious risks of the war zone, contrary to his instrucduct of captain.
.
.
.
.
d
·d
1· h
tions, It was to his O\vn Interest to estroy evi ence \V uc
would have incriminated him even in the eyes of those
by whom he \Vas commissioned. Specifically, the destruction of the log, containing the record of his course,
the erasure of the course from the map, and the expression of the wish that the vessel rright strike a mine, are
explicable on this theory. If he had really made any
observations of value to the enemy, that he should have
entered these iii. his log, as the judge of first instance
surmises, is highly improbable. In that case, moreover,
he \Vould doubtless have destroyed the book, even before
the visiting officer carne on board. Then, too, the latter,
who examined the log, noticed ro entries of this sort.
If, in accordance with what has been said, the conclusions which the judge of first instance draws from the
behavior of the captain do not appear valid, the judg-
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ment itself must be sustained on a different ground. The
latter concerns the point of departure of the argument of
the prize court, according to which, navigating within
the war zone, in and of itself, had no influence upon the
application of article 6c of the Prize Code. This view
can not be concurred in.
The provision of article 6c is borrowed from Conven- H~~ee vc~:V!n~
tion XI of the Hague conference. It is based upon a tion.
proposal of the Italian delegate, which originally contained two clauses. The first of these set up the principle
later adopted in the con~ention, while the second contained a provision that the enemy state which \vishes to
set forth a vessel for the purposes alluded to must notify
its opponent to that effect. On his part, the latter must
grant a safe conduct, in which he must specify the conditions under which he will grant the vessel this privileged
treatment (" indiquant les conditions de l' exemption").
The ninth session of the Comite d'exaraen dealt with
the proposal. That the general principle required certain
restrictions, such as had found expression in the proposal
of the I tal ian delegate, met with no opposition. Difference of opinion ·arose only as to the formal requirement
of a safe conduct, and as to the consequences if the ves~el
had not obtained one.
Under these circumstances, the fact that finally only
the clause expressing the general principle was incorporated into the convention does not justify the assumption that it was intended to deny the competence of the
belligeren~ state to specify in detail the conditions under
which it would concede to the vessels c_oncerned the
privilege assured to them in the convention. As a matter
of fact, the unlimited application of the general principle
would lead to untenable consequences. If, for instance,
one were to regard it as sufficient that a ship be conveying
food to the inhabitants of occupied territory, in which
scarcity of food prevailed, the necessary consequences
would be that one would have to give safe passage to
enemy vessels as \vell, if they \vere conveying necessities
of life to the enemy's territory under the same assumptions. This proves that the principle can not have heen
conceived as broadly as might be assumed from the \vording. On the contrary, the idea which \vas put for\vard
in the deliberations, to \vit, that the application of the
general principle requires greater precision in special
cases, must be regarded as applicable especially in the
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case of vessels "\vhich, like the one in question, are dedicated to philanthropic missions only during the \var,
occasionally, and not permanently even in time of peace.
E ngllsh deEnglish decisions also take this point of vie\v. A
cis ions,
German vessel engaged in taking women and children
from the fortress of Tsingtau to Tientsin \vas seized as
prize. The prize court in I-Iongkong held the capture
was legal, adopting the opinion that the vessel \Vas not
charged with a philanthropic mission in the sense of
article 4 of the eleventh Hague convention. If, so the
court reasoned, such a situatio:rtwas meant to be covered
by the Hague convention, the provision in question
would not be couched in such vague and indefinite terms.
On the contrary, such a. contingency would have been
provided for expressly and unambiguously. Were one
to put as broad a construction on the expression "philanthropic mission" as did the plaintiff, it \Vould lead to
serious consequences, which could not possibly have
been intended by the wording of the article. ( Cf. case
of the Paklat, 1 Trehern, British and Colonial Prize
Cases, 515.) Thus, the English courts, too, adopt the
view that an unlimited application of that general
principle, at least as regards enemy ships, is not within
the meaning of the provision.
As a matter of fact, then, shipping for the relief commission takes place not only under the protection of
article 6c of the Prize Code, but on the basis of an agreement between the German Government and the interested neutrals, which is embodied in the safe conduct
which every relief ship must have \vith it on both the
outbound and return voyage. In this safe conduct,
several conditions are set up, whose fulfillment is desigOonditions ot nated as the premises of preferential treatment.
Moresafe passage.
over, it contains a clause to the effect that the safe
conduct has reference solely to the high seas outside of
the \Var zones. In view of the history of the origin of
article 6c of the Prize Code given above, it must be
assumed that vessels which, contrary to prescriptions of
their safe conduct, traverse the blockaded areas, not only
expose themselves to the danger of destruction connected
therewith, but forfeit the benefit of article 6c of the
Prize Code as well.
Since, as has been shown, the captain of the Haelen
was not compelled by any urgent necessity, tantamount
to force maJeure, to traverse the barred zone, he has
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forfeited the right to special treatment, in accordance
vvith vvhat has been said of this claim. Therefore, his
vessel, together with its cargo, is subject to the general
provisions of prize lavv, namely, inasmuch as both 'vere
admittedly of enemy ovvnership at the time of capture,
condemnation. Notwithstanding this, the major part
of the cargo, as the records show, and as substantiated
by the representative of the Commission for Relief in
Belgium, has in the meantime been restored to the commission. Whether grounds of equity argue in favor of
extending this concession to the rest of the cargo as well is
a question which does not lie within the competence of
the prize court, but is rather to be decided by the proper
authorities of the Government.
The judgment is therefore affirmed. The decision on
the question of costs is conditioned by section 37 of the
prize court rules.
THE "WAUBESA"
(American lvfaritime Cases, 1923, p. 659)

United States of America, as owner of steamship Waubesa, libellant,
v. City of New York, as owner of ferries Queens and Mayor
Gaynor, respondent, and cross libel, etc.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEvV YORK
May 3, 1923
AUGUSTUS N. HAND, D. J.: This case involves a col- statement
.
.
b etween t h e steamsh.1p TI7
.
rrau besa, b e1ong1ng
to t h e the case.
11s1on
United States, and the ferryboats Queens and ),fayor
Gaynor, belonging to the city of Nevv York. The collision
occurred on March 17, 1919, in New York Harbor, during
a dense fog. The Waubesa was anchored at or near the
anchorage grounds in the upper bay to the south,vest of
Bedloes Island.
The United States appeared specially and filed a plea
to the jurisdiction to the effect that the Waubesa 'vas not
employed as a merchant vessel but 'vas engaged in the
European food relief service, 'vhich is alleged to be a
purely governmental function.
In the first libel the United States sues to recover for Libels.
damages caused the Waubesa by the collision, and the
city of New York files a cross libel alleging that the
collisions 'vere due to the negligence of those in charge

of
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of the Waubesa in that the latter was anchored in the
channel way and in that she did not ring her bell as
required by la'v so as to notify vessels of her position at,
anchor.
The second libel is filed by the Grain Corporation
against the city of New York, and alleges that the libellant.
shipped on board the Waubesa grain in good order and
condition to be carried from N e'v York to European
ports, that the Waubesa, with libellant's cargo on board,
took up anchorage on the general anchorage grounds at.
a point to the south and east of the Statue of Liberty in
New York Harbor, where the municipal ferries Queens-·
and William J. Gaynor negligently collided with her, to·
the damage of the merchandise belonging to the Grain
Corporation. The city of. New York impleaded the
United States as the one primarily liable, claiming the·
right to sue it under the provisions of the act of March.
9, 1920.

In the third libel, the United States Grain Corporation,.
organized under the laws of the State of Dela,vare,.
alleges that the Waubesa vvas a general ship engaged in
the common carriage of merchandise by water for hire·
and was being operated under the control and direction.
of the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet
Corporation; that the Grain Corporation shipped rye·
grain on ·the Waubesa in good order and condition to be·
carried from Philadelphia to Falmouth, England; that .
the Waubesa instead of proceeding to Falmouth, put in
to the port of N e'v York, having oil and water in the·
bilges, and beiag in such a condition that it was deemed
best by those in charge of her not to proceed upon hervoyage to Falmouth; that the cargo of grain was dis-charged in the port of New York not in good order and
condition as when shipped, but seriously injured and
damaged by contact with fuel oil and sea water, for all
of which damages are sought. The United States ismade respondent under the act of March 9, 1920, in
place of the Waubesa and the Emergency Fleet Corporation, and the city of New York is impleaded under theadmiralty rule on the ground that it is primarily responsible for the alleged damage.
[The court here reviews the evidence upon the question
of liability for the collision and concludes that the city
of New York is liable owing to the fact that the ferryboats 'vhich struck the Waubesa were being navigated
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in the fog at an improper speed, estimated as 7 to 8
knots.]
The claim that the city of New York can not limit its
liability because its regulation for the municipal ferries
contravened the inland rules seems to me without merit.
Regulation 26 reads as follows:
"In a fog, mist, falling snow, or heavy rainstorms,
boats must run at half speed, or less, having careful
regard to the existing circumstances and conditions. If
the weather is so thick or foggy that the regular advertised schedule can not be maintained with safety to the
ferryboats they will be run slo,vly and ~autiously without regard to the schedule and proceed with great care
and caution."
Article 16 of the inland rules says:
"Every vessel shall, in a fog, mist, falling sno,v, or
heavy rainstorms, go at a moderate speed, having careful regard to the existing circun1stances and conditions."
It is contended that the words "boats must be run ·at
half speed or less" suggest running at half speed under
unsafe conditions. I see no ground for this. Each regulation prescribes a caution and a limitation of speed
dependent on the circumstances. It might as well be
argued that the municipal regulation imposed greater
moderation rather than less. In my opinion the two
regulations are equivalents. There is no proof that the
city rule was not made in good faith. The words of the
Supreme Court in La Bourgoyne, 210 U. S. at p. 126 are
applicable:
"* * * The petitioner having shown the promulgation of regulations for the conduct of its business, which
exacted a compliance by the captains of its vessels with
the international rules, we think the burden of proving
that the rules were not promulgated in good faith or that
a willful departure from their requirements 'vas indulged
in, and was brought home to or countenanced by the
petitioner, was cast upon the claimants, and that the
court properly held that that burden was not sustained
by the evidence.''
In my opinion the municipal regulations, 'vhile differently phrased, were in entire accordance 'vith the
inland rules, and the city sustained the burden imposed
by law of proving the absence of privity in respect to
undue speed in a fog.

Regulations.
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The Grain Corporation contends that the ship 'vas
Seaworthiness. unseaworthy because oil leaked from the tank and got
into the grain and that for this reason the exceptions in
the bill of lading and under the Harter Act are not ap:plicable.
[The court here reviews the evidence upon this point,
and concludes as follows:]
It seems clear, therefore, that oil which had leaked
from the tanks caused the damage in holds 1 and 2, and
that the collision and the resulting beaching of the vessel
contributed to this da1nage.
The suit by the Grain Corporation against the United
States is for failure to deliver the grain shipped and
receipted for in good order in accordance with the terms
of the bill of lading. As Goble, the master (deposition,
p. 13) and Glen, the inspector for the United States
Shipping Board (minutes, p. 82), both said, the trip \Vas
really a trial trip, though the voyage for which the cargo
was shipped was from Philadelphia to Falmouth. The
vessel left Philadelphia with oil in her bilges under the
protest of her engineer, and in substance that of her
master also (Goble deposition, p. 8). The soundings,
however inaccurate, showed a large amount of oil in her
bilges, and this oil, when the vessel listed as a result of
the accident, damaged the grain in holds 1 and 2. It
seems clear that the vessel should not have left Philadelphia under such circumstances and that she was
unseaworthy for the carriage of grain. Moreover, the
Deviation.
trial trip was a deviation by an unseaworthy vessel that
deprived the Waubesa of the benefit of the exceptions
in the bill of lading and the provisions for exemption of
the Harter Act. The St. Paul (1921), 277 Fed. 99; The
Elizabeth Dantzler (1920), 263 Fed. 596. The _Waubesa
was not definitely proceeding on her voyage, but only
going to New York and then on in case she 'vas found fit
and after she was satisfied that the oil could be pumped
out and did not imperil the cargo. N e'v York 'vas not a
port of refuge, but a stopping place for convenience on a
trial trip, 'vhich, irrespective of the delay caused by the
collision, proved to be a stopping place of long duration
because of the condition of the vessel. I can hardly see
a more fit application for the doctrine of deviation.
Under such circumstances if the vessel 'vere not
Government owned the Grain Corporation could reLiability.
cover damages to her cargo and the owner of the Waubesa
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would have the right to recover over from the city of
New York the total damages to the grain caused by
water in holds 4 and 5 and one-half of damages caused
by oil in holds 1 and 2. The city could limit in all cases.
The United States has filed exceptions to the jurisdiction because:
(1) The Waubesa \Vas not e1nployed as a merchant
vessel, but was engaged in public business;
(2) The libel is for the sole benefit and account of
private underwriters;
(3) The policies of insurance issued by underwTiters Jurisdiction.
were issued to an agency of the United States. Hence
the underwriters are not in a position to sue;
(4) Any money paid by under\\rriters should inure
to the benefit of the United States.
In order to establish that the Waubesa \Vas not employed as a merchant vessel, but \Vas engaged in public ne!'s~blic busl·
business, counsel for the United States has introduced
documentary proof that the Grain Corporation \Vas
incorporated by the United States in pursuance of an
Executive order and that by Executive orders the
President managed the corporation and arranged for
an increase and decrease of its capital stock; that the
Government owned the stock of the corporation and
that by Exe.cutive order its liquidation \Vas provided
for and the assets were to be paid into the Treasury of
the United States. The Governrnent also sho\ved that
the Grain Corporation in delivering the grain shipped
on the Waubesa, which was shipped under a bill of lading
providing for delivery to the order of the United States
Grain Corporation, care of American Embassy, London,
was really engaged in the relief of the starving countries
in the East and not in mercantile business. The case of
The Western Maid (1 922), 257 U. S. 419, is relied upon.
That vessel, like the lVaubesa, \Vas o\vned by the United
States and was engaged in transporting foodstuffs for
the relief of the civilian population of Europe. 1'he
Supreme Court said (Mr. Justice Hohnes \vriting for
the majority, p. 431):
"* * * It is suggested that the lVestern Jfaid \Vas
a merchant vessel at the time of the collision, but the
fact that the food was to be paid for and the other detnils
adverted to in argument can not disguise the obvious
truth, that she was engaged in a public service that \Vas
one of the constituents of our activity in the \Val' and its
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sequel and that had no more to do \vith ordinary merchandizing than if she had carried a regiment of troops."
The same view \Vas taken by the Supreme Court in
the recent case of United States Grain Corporation vs.
Phillips, 1923 A. M. C. 312, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 283, 67
L. Ed. 342, Feb. 19, 1923, where a naval officer carried
gold from Constantinople to New York on the steamship
Laub, a destroyer in the Navy. This gold was being
forwarded on the Laub in payment by Bulgaria for wheat
furnished by the Grain Corporation, and the captain of
the Laub, under a statute applicable to shipments by
private persons or corporations, claimed a commission
for the carriage of the gold. The court said that in substance the gold was the property of the United States
and while the legal title was in the Grain Corporation
and the property of that corporation might have been
taken to pay a judgment rendered against it, yet the
property was clothed with such a public interest "that
the transportation of it no more could be charged for by
a public officer than the carrying of a gun, we must look
not at the legal title only but at the fact~ beneath forms."
The counsel for the Grain Corporation endeavors to
distinguish these cases on the ground that in the case at
bar the Grain Corporation employed its own assets in
purchasing the grain instead of carrying grain as in the
Western Jfaid purchased with funds appropriated directly by Congress; that it also insured the grain, as is
not done in a direct government transaction, and paid
freight to the Waubes~ and received bills of lading therefor. The proof sho\vs, however, that the object of the
governmental activities was the relief of Europe and that
any profit over cost which the Grain Corporation may
have made was only for the purpose of paying interest on
moneys advanced to purchase supplies to relieve the,
famine-stricken countries. I can not regard the distinctions as sufficient to take the case out of the sweeping
decisions in The Western Maid and United States Grain
Corporation vs. Phillips, supra.
Advances by the underwriters to cover damage to the
grain cargo have been made in ~onsideration that "best
endeavors to recover the value of the flour * * * from
any and all persons and corporations who may be liable
therefor" would be exercised. Such a clause can not,
however, create a right on the part of the Grain Corpora-
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tion against the United States when the latter has not by
appropriate legislation consented to be sued. 'l'he
Western Maid and the case of United States Grain Corporation vs. Phillips preclude any such result. Whether
or not the warranty in the insurance policies that the
insurance shall not inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of the carrier is sufficient to avoid the insurance in
this case because of the fact that the United States Grain
Corporation, as well as the United States Emergency
Fleet Corporation, really belong by reason of stock ownership to the United States, is not a matter for determination in this litigation. I can not see that these \varranties, or the clause in the loan receipts that "the Grain
Corporation shall use its best endeavors to recover the
value of the flour * * * from any and all persons and
corporations who may be liable therefor * * *" can
affect the rights of the parties here.
While it is true that if the Waubesa had under the
meaning of the decisions been a "merchant vessel" the
damages suffered by the Grain Corporation would have
been divided as between the city of New York and the
United States, yet the Grain Corporation itself would
have been entitled to recover the whole of its damages
again~t either wrong doer. ·The Beaconsfield, (189.5)
158 U. S. 303. The English rule that owners of the
cargo could only recover one-half of their damages from
each par.ty does not apply in our courts. Ralli vs.
Societa Anonima di Navigazione (1915), 222 Fed. 944,
at page 998. Inasmuch, however, as neither the United
States nor the Wau.besa are liable to suit, the Grain
Corporation may prove its full damages against the
city of New York subject to the right of the latter to
limit. In proof of its claim against the surrendered
vessels, or their proceeds, the claim for damages of
the .United States for injuries to the Waubesa should
be deferred to the claim of the Grain Corporation since
the Waubesa was unseaworthy and guilty of a deviation.
The George W. Roby, 6th C. C. A., 1901, 111 Fed. 601.
In the first libel an interlocutory decree is granted
to the United States against the city of New York with
right of the latter to limit damages to proved value
of surrendered vessels. The cross libel of the city of
New York against the United States of America is
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Dt?ci.5icn.
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In the second libel brought by the United States
Grain Corporation against the city of N evv York, an
interlocutory decree is granted to the libellant, with
the right to the city of N e'\v York to limit the amount
of damages to proved v~lue of the surrendered vesseis.
The petition impleading the United States of America
is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. There are two
claimants to the same fund in the foregoing libels,
namely, the United States and the United States Grain
Corporation, and the causes have all been tried together .
. For the reasons hereinbefore stated the claim for damages
of the United States _for injuries to the Waubesa should
be deferred to the claim of the Grain Corporation since
the Waub~sa was unseaworthy and guilty of a deviation.
The third libel brought by the United States Grain
Corporation against the United States of America is
dismissed for want of jurisdiction and the petition by
the United States of America impleading the city of
New York is dismissed.
Settle deCTees on notice.
THE "CONNER"; THE "ESPERANZA"
(American l-.1aritime Cases, 1924, p. li 70)
l"~ew

York & Cuba Mail Steamship Co., libellant, vs. United
States of A1nerica, respondent, and cross libel
~

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF NE\V YORK
July 29, 1924

WINSLow, D. J.:

These are cross suits in admiraltyone brought by the New York & Cuba Mail Steamship
Co., owner of S. S. Esperanza, against the United States,
owner of the torpedo-boat destroyer Conner, and by the
United States against the S. S. Esperanza, to recover
damages arising from a collision between the Esperanza
and the Chnner on February 15, 1918, off Barnegat.
By act of Congress approved February 28, 1923,
jurisdiction was conferred upon this court to hear and
determine the suit and to enter a judgment or decree
"upon the same principles and measures of liability as
in like causes in admiralty bet'\veen private parties."
(67th Cong., Private Act No. 192.)
The facts material to the determination of the issues,
not disputed, are as follows:

THE CONNER AND THE ESPERANZA

The Esperanza, with pas·sengers and cargo, left Brook- ca:e~cts
lyn at 3.05 p. m., February 14, 1918, bound for Cuban
and Mexican ports. At 7.55 she passed Scotland Light,
her course being S. by W. Y2 W. This course was
maintained until off Sea Girt, when it was changed to
S. by W. 7.1 W., and later was changed to S. by W.
At 10.25 p.m., the weather h~ving thickened, the engines
were put half speed and fog signals \Vere sounded at
regular intervals. At 10.30 fog shut in and speed was
reduced to slow. About 10.40 the speed \Vas reduced
to dead slow-3 to 4 knots, "just steerage way." The
Esperanza' s fog whistles, in the meantime, were blown
at regular intervals. At 12.08 a. m., February 15,
ship's time, while running at dead slow on a course
S. by W., the fog signal of another vessel \Vas heard
about three points on the starboard bow of Esperanza.
The master and second officer were on the bridge and a
lookout stationed on the forecastle head. The fog
signal was heard and reported by the lookout, \Vhereupon
the Esperanza blew a regular blast of her fog \vhistle.
The captain then took the whistle cord and blew three
fog whistles at approximately three-quarter minute
intervals. No whistle was heard from the Conner
during this time. Then a loud whistle was heard from
the Conner and, at the same tin1e, she broke out of the
fog, apparently coming at high speed and ahnost hnmediately struck the Esperanza a glancing blow on her
starboard side, thence disappearing in the fog under
the Esperanza' s stern. An inspection disclosed that
the Esperanza was able to make port without assistance
and she put about, heading toward New York, \Vhere
she arrived February 15, at 12.32 p. m.
The Conner, a new torpedo-boat destroyer, left Philadelphia February 14, 1918, for Newport, R. I., under
orders to make test runs of 12.16, and 20 knots, using
the cruising combination of her turbines. Ten minutes
prior to the termination of the 12-knot test, at 9.30 p.m.,
February 14, a dense fog shut in, \vhich continued until
the collision. The 12-knot test was terminated at 9.40
p. m., \Vhen the engines were shifted to high-pressure
combination, but no change \Vas made in the Conner's
speed of 12 knots.
The Conner passed Five Fathom Bank Jjghtship at
7.20 p. m . .about 100 yards on her port beam. From
there her course \Vas made at 34 ° true. Her course and
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speed of 12 knots were held until the collision occurred.
The Conner's comlnander testified that at 12.12 a. m.
February 15:
cJ'n~!:~onboci! "I heard a sound * * * This sound attracted my
mander.
attention on the ground that it might be a fog signal. I
inquired and found no one else on the bridge had heard
anything which sounded like a fog signal. I gave immediate orders to exercise unusual diligence in listening
and to sound our own signal, so that if this sound had
been a fog signal we would have given an immediate
response to the other vessel. Our signal had just been
sounded when, through the fog, came a loud, piercing
fog signal of a steam vessel under way on our port bow.
I immediately called out 'Stop the engines' and, being the
•
nearest person to the engine-room telegraph shoved them
myself to the stop position and got the stop signal back
from the engine room."
The commander further says that" The only thing which was seen at first was a string
of white lights, nothing to indicate the heading of a
vessel or her character.''
He thereupon ordered "hard right" to the steersman
and" just after that a green light appeared close under the
bow and the Conner struck a glancing blow against some
~
large vessel."
It may be noticed that the Conner's engines were ordered stopped and her helm put "hard right" before
either of the Esperanza's side lights came into vie\V. The
engines were not reversed nor her head\vay checked and
she continued on, striking the Esperanza on the starboard
side, glancing off and passing under the Esperanza' s stern
and disappearing in the fog.
The litigants do not agree as to the place of the collision. The commander of the Conner fixes it at about 12
miles from Barnegat buoy. The Esperanza fixes it at 3
miles southeast of Barnegat buoy.
Owing to the fact that no suit could be brought, due
to lack of the court's jurisdiction, until after the act of
Congress some five years after the collision, the depositions could not be taken earlier. Owing to the lapse of
time, only two depositions of Esperanza' s \Vitnesses were
produced-that of the master of the Esperanza and of
the second officer, both of \vhom \Vere in extremely
feeble health. There was also received in evidence, how-

INTERNATIONAL RULES
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ever, the record of the proceedings of the investigation
on board U. S. S. Arkansas, February 16, 1918, made
pursuant to order of the commander of the Battleship
Force 2, United States Atlantic Fleet. There is also in
evidence the record of the investigation held by the
Steamboat Inspection Service at the office of the local
inspectors in New York on February 28, 1918.
In determining the question of responsibility, the conduct of each vessel will be considered separately. The
International Rules adopted for the purpose of preventing collisions provide that the regulations. to that end
"shall be followed by all public and private vessels of
the United States upon the high seas."
"ART. 16. Every vessel shall in a fog mist falling International
'
'
rules.
snow, or heavy rainstorm, go at a moderate speed, having careful regard for the existing circumstances and
conditions."
That these rules govern the navigation of a war vessel in time of war has been distinctly held by this court.
Watts vs. U. S., 123 Fed. 105. This case arose out of
a collision between the U.S. S. Columbia and the Foscolia
during the Spanish-American War. It was contended
that the Columbia was proceeding at an immoderate
speed in fog, the speed, however, being 6 knots. The
Government contended that the failure of a war vessel
to obey the navigation rules during war time was excusable. The court refused to agree with this contention.
In the act which authorized the present suit it is provided, among other things, that the issues shall be determined "upon the same principles and measures of
liability as in the cases in admiralty between private
parties.''
The Oonner was under a duty to observe the rule as to
moderate speed in like manner as a privately operated
ship in the admittedly dense fog.
·
In a recent case, in which Judge Ward wrote the opinion, not yet reported (N.Y. & Porto Rico S. S. Go.
vs. Director General, June 3, 1924) the definition of a
dense fog is given as the obscuration of objects 1,000
feet away or less.
Some evidence in the instant case is that the fog \vas
so thick that the lookout on the Conner's bow could not
be seen from her bridge 50 feet away. Commander
Howe, a most excellent witness, described the visibility
as "between 50 and 100 yards."
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What is a moderate speed, is of course a relative term,
but it has been the subject of frequent comment and determination.
The Colorado, 91 U. S. 692, 702; The Nacoochee, 137

u. s. 330, 339.

Mr. Justice Brown, in The Umbria, 160 U. S. 404,
stated the rule as follows:
'' The general consensus of opinion in this country is to
the effect that a steamer is bound to use only such precautions as will enable her to stop in time to avoid a
collision, after the approaching vessel comes in sight, provided such approaching vessel is herself going at the
moderate speed required by law."
And, again, in The Chattahoochee, 173 U. S. 540, Mr.
Justice Brown again referred to the rule, using the following language:
"No absolute rule can be extracted from these cases.
So much depends upon the density of fog and the chance
of meeting other vessels in the neighborhood, that it is
impossible to say what ought to be considered moderate
speed under all circumstances. It has been said by this
court in respect to steamers that they are bound to
reduce their speed to such a rate as will enable them to
stop in time to avoid a collision after an approaching
vessel comes in sight, provided such approaching vessel
is herself going at the moderate speed required by la,v"
(p. 548).

Ordinarily, it would hardly be debatable that a speed
of 12 knots in a fog of the density which prevailed at the
time of the collision in the instant case 'vould be wholly
unwarranted and immoderate. Indeed, many times this
court has held that a very much less speed than 12 knots
is an immoderate speed.
The Columbia (supra))· The H. F. Dimock, 77 Fed. 226;
The Hilton, 213 Fed. 997; The Rosaleen, 214 Fed. 252.
The Government contends, however, that the Conner
was justified in proceeding at 12 knots because of her
tremendous backing power, which 'vould enable her to
stop in a shorter distance than ordinary vessels. Her
maximum speed was upwards of 30 knots. It is quite
apparent that, whatever the backing power of the
Conner may have been, it was of no avail here. That
speed in this dense fog brought her into collision in a few
seconds, before her engine power could even be brought
into play. The distance that the ships were visible to

MODERATE SPEED

each other in the fog and the speed at ,vhich they 'vere
approaching and traversing the space between them are
the real factors in the present problem. How futile is
engine power in stopping or reversing if the colliding
vessels are upon each other in a few seconds of time
before the power can be brought into play 1
In The J.fanchioneal, 243 Fed. 801, the Circuit Court
said:
" * * * Speed is always excessive in a. vessel that
cannot reverse her engines and come to a standstill
before she collides with a vessel that she ought to have
seen, having regard to fog density." (Citing cases.)
In The Haven, 277 Fed. 957, the court said:
"A vessel navigating in a fog must go no faster than
will permit her to stop within the distance she can see
ahead" (p. 959).
In The Oity o.f Nor_folk, 266 Fed. 641, the court said:
"In such navigation 'moderate speed' means speed so
slow that a vessel can be stopped within the distance at
which another vessel can be seen.''
At the rate of 12 knots, the Conner was making approximately 1,300 feet per minute, or 300 feet in about 15
seconds. According to the witnesses, the boats, when
visible to each other, were at most not over 150 to 300
feet apart. According to the commander's testimony,
it would have been impossible to stop the Conner's speed
of 12 knots at the point when they became visible. It
may be speculation to endeavor to estimate what might
have been done had the Conner been proceeding slower,
but we are dealing with what actually happened at a
speed which the court believes 'vas highly excessive under
the circumstances with the known result.
In the case of Watts v. U. S. (supra) the warship
Columbia was proceeding at about 6 knots per hour. The
vessel with which she collided, the Foscolia, was not seen
by anyone on the Columbia until she was within 75 yards.
The Esperanza claims that the Conner was further at
fault in failing to obey further provisions of article 16 of
the International Rules, wherein it is provided that" A steam vessel hearing, apparently forward of her
beam, the fog signal of a vessel, the position of \vhich
is not ascertained, shall, so far as the circumstances of
the case admit, stop her engines and then navigate with
caution until danger of collision is over."
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This rule is, of course, applicable to the Esperanza, as
well as to the Conner. In view of the excessive speed of
the Conner, which I believe was the proximate and contributing cause of the collision, the Experanza's failure
to wholly stop her engines recedes in importance. It is
not clear that the Conner heard the Experanza' s first fog
signal, although the commandei: says he heard a sound
he thought might be a fog signal. Although his sense
of hearing indicated that it might be a fog whistle, no
change of speed took place. In Lie v. San Francisco &
J>ortland S. S. Go., 243 U. S. 291, the master of the Selja
attempted to excuse his failure to stop as required by
article 16 by saying that \vhen he first heard the faint
signal from the approaching vessel he thought it might
be a foghorn on the shore. The court, however, overruled
the Selja's contention and held that the provisions of
article 16 were mandatory and required all vessels to stop
their engines immediately. The same argument, ho\vever, as to the duty of the Esperanza might be applied
to her, unless the circumstances of the case do not so
admit. Neither of the navigators was free to substitute
his judgment for the positive requirements of the rule.
A former navigation rule vested the navigator \vith a
rut! and story degree of discretion.
The present rule is mandatory
and is positive law. It is also true that the position of a
vessel whose fog signal is heard must be ascertained
· before proceeding. Three elements are involved, indeed,
before proceeding-bearing, distance, and course. vVhatever we might say, however, in regard to the duty to
stop, it seems to me that the paramount negligenceindeed, the proximate cause, of the collision-was the
excessive speed of the Conner and her failure to observe
the rule regarding speed in fog. It is admitted by the
commander of the Conner that had her speed been 4 knots,
the collision would not have occurred. The 12-knot
speed had continued for quite a time before the collision,
and brought her swiftly to the point of collision.
In view of the court's conclusion, I do not deem it
necessary to consider the question as to whether the
Conner \Vas at fault for changing her course before the
position and course of the Esperanza had been ascertained.
The commander of the Conner hard aported his helm as
soon as the Esperanza' s "string of lights" broke in to
view, and he admitted that in so doing he "gambled"
on the Esperanza's course. However, I think it is proper
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to conclude that the error, if it was error, was committed
at the moment of collision and may be regarded 'vith less
strictness than one committed when the vessels are more
distant from each other. In like manner, reference
might be made to the alleged contention that the Conner
was at fault for failing to reverse her engines. This
contention, however, is of interest n1ore particularly
because the Conner contends that she was justified in
maintaining a speed of 12 knots, because of her tremendous backing power. That tremendous backing povverwhich was not exercised at the moment of crisis-disposes of the argument that the speed was excusable.
The potential power was neither brought into play, nor
in all human probability could it have had any effect in
avoiding the collision, if used. In considering the responsibility of the Esperanza, the court does not deem it
necessary to consider the charge that she \Vas navigated
by persons not wholly ~ompetent. The evidence is to
the contrary, and this contention requires no consideration; but the question as to whether or not the Esperanza
should have stopped her engines when she heard the fog
signal of the Conner requires consideration.
For more than an hour prior to the collision the
evidence satisfies the court that the Esperanza had been
making perhaps 3 knots, which was barely steerage,vay.
Not only 'vas that the testimony of the Esperanza' s
witnesses, but it is also supported by the Esperanza' s
engine-room slate. "The ship 'vas turning over just as
slow as the engine can be turned.''
Assuming that the burden also rests upon the Esperanza of showing not merely that her failure to stop her
engines 'vhen she heard the signal of the Conner might
not have been one of the causes, or, rath er, that it could
not have been one of the causes of the collision, the
record convinces me that that burden h as been sustained. Had she stopped her engines, she 'vould have
lost steerageway entirely and "could not have been
maneuvered." The failure of the Esperanza to stop her
engines, assuming that it was her duty so to do, could
not have been one of the causes of the collision. It 'vas
the gross negligence on the part of th e Conner 'vhich
accounts for the collision. In The City of Ne1v Yorlc, 14 7
U. S. 72, at p. 85 Mr. Justice Brown said:
"Where fault on the part of one vessel is established
by uncontradicted testimony, and such fault is of itself

Burden.
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sufficient to account for the disaster, it is not enough for
such vessel to raise a doubt with regard to the management of the other vessel."
The Conner did not stop her engines when the commander "thought" he heard a whistle \Vhen proceeding
at 12 knots, nor yet did he reverse his engines at any
time either before or after the Esperanza became visible.
He did, however, change his course. It no\V appears
that had the rudder been put over exactly the opposite
way, it vvould have "worked out better," as the commander said. Ho\vever, these acts were done in extremis,
and ought not to be considered faults of navigation.
The excessive speed of the Conner, particularly in its
relation to the bare steerageway of the Esperanza, leads
me to t:q.e conclusion that the total stoppage of the
Esperanza's engines \Vould not have prevented the
collision, nor yet did that failure on her part in any way
contribute to it. The Esperanza, at her speed, would
have moved a negligible distance in the time that the
Conner would have traversed a very considerable distance.
The relation bet\veen t\vo n1oving objects with differences
of speed such as those t\vo vessels is similar to the relation of an almost stationary object and a moving object.
The negligence of the Conner continued to operate as
an efficient cause until the moment of the collision.
The libel of the United States against the S. S. Esperanza should be dismissed, with costs, and a decree \Vill
be entered in favor of the libellant.

THE "MUDROS"
May 2, 1918
(2 Entscheidungen des Oberprisengerichts in Berlin, 87)

In the case of the steamer Mudros the imperial superior prize court, in its session of May 2, 1918, has
decided that the complaint of the imperial commissioner
in Hamburg against the decree of the prize court of that
place of May 18, 1917, must be rejected as inadmissible ..
Reasons:
Stat em ent of
The steamer Mudros was before the \Var a German
the facts.
merchant vessel and was lying in an I tali an port at the
time when Italy entered the \Var. The Italian GovernRequisition by ment later req~isitioned the vessel a1~d handed it over to
fo reign gover n.
·
· use. I t sa1·1 e d un d er
ment.
the I tahan
State R a1hvays
for their
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the Italian flag, and on such a voyage was sunk in mi
ocean by a German submarine. '"fhe case came before
the prize court in Hamburg, which denied its competence inasmuch as it lacked proof that the vessel had
lost its German character.
The judgment itself is to the point even if the considerations noted, upon which it rests, can not be concurred in. The Mudros should have been regarded as a
public vessel of Italy at the time of sinking, and should
have been treated accordingly. In accordance with
Article 2 of the Prize Code, vessels employed in services
of the state, under the control of the state, are reckoned
as public vessels, and public vessels of the enemy are forfeited without further formality under the laws of war.
The suppositions mentioned \Vere present in the case of
the Mudros, she having been requisitioned by the Italian
Government and employed for purposes of state under
the Italian flag. On this ground, overtures for judicial
proceedings before the prize court must in truth be
refused.
The complaint of the imperial commissioner, therefore,
requires no actual change in the decision attacked. Inasmuch, however, as the prize court rules only take cognizance of judicial methods by which a decision as such
can be attacked, the complaint must be rejected.

Public vessel.

THE "SAO VICENTE"
(295 F. 829)

Transportes Maritimos Do Estado v. 'J;. A. Scott Co. (Inc.)
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD CIRCUIT
January 9, 1924

WooLLEY, Circuit Judge: The question brought here

on this appeal, broadly stated, is whether the District
Court lost its jurisdiction in admiralty on a suggestion
of immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit. The
general rule exempting a government, sovereign in its
attributes, from being sued \vithout its consent is not
disputed. Porto R1:co v. Rosaly, 227 U. S. 270. The
real question in the case is whether the sovereign, under
the circumstances, gave or withheld its consent.
The steamship Sao Vicente stranded on Packet Rock, statement
Sconticut Point, Mass. She \Vas floated and delivered facts.
at Ne\V Bedford by the T. A. Scott Co. Later she made

or
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her way to New York Harbor where, incurring debts for
repairs and supplies and failing to pay them, she was
arrested under several libels filed in the District Court
of the United States for the Southern District of New
York and under this libel filed in the District Court of
the United States for the District of New Jersey. Being
represented in several suits by the same proctors who
pursued in each suit the same line of defense, the proceedings in some of the actions are, in the main, the
same, and, to a certain extent, the questions raised are
likewise the same. Hence, we refer to the opinion of
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
The Sao Vicente, 281 Fed. 111, for a statement in detail
of proceedings which, with the quoted pleadings, are,
in a measure; similar, mutatis mutandis, to those in the
case at bar.
We shall discuss the law applicable to the proceedings
in the order in which they occurred.
On April 11, 1921, the T. A. Scott Co. filed a libel in
the district court against the steamship Sao Vicente and
Transportes Maritimos Do Estado for salvage services.
Whatever may be the character of this body, there can
be no doubt of the libellant's right to institute suit or
of the jurisdiction of the district court initially to entertain suit against it. Nor did the Transportes Maritimas Do Estado question either this right of the libellant
or the jurisdiction of the court just then, but appeared
by its proctors and filed a claim of ownership in the usual
form, concluding with a prayer for leave to defend the
action (281 Fed. 112).
There was nothing said or done to indicate either the
fact or purpose of a special appearance. Without doubt
the claimant's appearance was general. Pursuant thereto, its proctors proceeded to a stipulation for costs, and
to a stipulation for value in the usual form (281 Fed.
113), upon condition to "abide by all orders of the court,
interlocutory and final, and to pay the amount awarded."
Whereupon the ship 'vas released from custody and she
sailed away.
im·
On June 2, 1921, the claimant changed its proctors.
On the same day its new proctor filed its answer, traversing none of the averments of the libel, but raising for
the first time the defense that the ship is a Portuguese
vessel O\vned and operated by the Transportes Maritimos
Do Estrada, \Vhich is a department of the Republic of

CLAIM OF' IMMUNITY

Portugal; that it objects to and protests against the
assumption of jurisdiction by the District Court in a
suit to which the sovereign foreign government has not
consented, maintaining that the settlement of the matter
in dispute "should be left to the Portuguese consul at
the port of New York." 281 Fed. 113.
The answer was verified by Prista, vice consul general
for the Republic of Portugal at New York.
[1] Exceptions by the libellant to the claimant's
answer were sustained by the District Court on the
ground that the claimant had entered a general appearance, and, having submitted itself to the jurisdiction of
the court, it thereby had waived any right to appear
specially at that late day for the purpose of attacking
its jurisdiction.
We think the court was right on two grounds: First,
because a sovereign may waive its immunity, and it is
considered to have done so when it has entered litigation
with a general appearance and when, as here, it has
acted for a time and in a manner entirely consistent with
such an appearance. Beers v. Arkansas, 20 lio'\\r. 527;
OZark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 447; Richardson v.
Fajardo Su.gar Co., 241 U. S. 44; Porto ;Rico v. Rosaly,
227 U. S. 270; Porto. Rico v. Ramos, 232 U. S. 627;
Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line, 200 U. S. 273, 284; The
Sao Vicente (C. C. A.), 281 Fed. 111. We know of no
more orderly way for a foreign government to consent to
suit and ·submit to jurisdiction than by the voluntary
act of entering a general appearance, and v;hen this is
follo\ved by conduct permissible only under an appearance of that character, the sovereign must be held to
have \Vaived its immunity to suit. It will not suffice for
it to change its attitude after the litigation is under
. way, for, as Mr. Justice McKenna, in the Ramos case,
supra, said:
"The immunity of sovereignty from suit \vithout its
consent can not be carried so far as to permit it to reverse
the action invoked by it and to come in and go out of
court &t its will, the other party having no right of
resistance to either step."
[2] Second, \Ve think the trial court \Vas right in sustaining the exceptions to the claimant's ans\ver for the
added reason that the suggestion of immunity of the
sovereign-itself insufficient in substance-was not n1ade
33474-25t·-3

25

26

VESSELS: O'VNERSHIP, CH ARTE R, A~D SERVICE

through the proper official channels. It was made in
the claimant's answer signed by its proctor and verified
by the Portuguese vice consul general at the port of
New York. 'I'hat the public status of a ship can not be
determined upon the mere suggestion of private counsel
was decided in ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522, and that the
consul general of the Republic of Portugal is not com petent, merely by virtue of his office, to appear in court
and claim immunity for his Government was decided
in The Sao Vicente, 260 U. S. 151, on certiorari to the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, it being
the case to v;hich 've have made frequent reference (281
Fed. 111). Lacking competency by virtue of his office
to speak for his Government, there is nothing in the
record which shows that the vice consul general 'vas
specially authorized by his Government to interpose a
claim to immunity on its behalf. Therefore, on the record as it stood after the court had, without error, sustained exceptions to the claimant's answer by striking
out the abortive suggestion of immunity of a sovereign,
the claimant remained on the record in the situation in
which it had placed itself by its general appearance.
Thereupon .th~ court entered an interlocutory decree
and made an order referring the amount of salvage to a
special commissioner. Here another substitution of
proctors occurred.
The claimant did not introduce before the commissioner any evidence in opposition to the libellant's claim
for salvage services, but presented to him an information, suggestion and petition of the Republic of Portugal
for immunity from suit. This, very naturally, the commissioner refused to accept. From this point the case
differs from The Sao Vicente (c.· C. A.) 281 Fed. 111.
On January 24, 1923, the commissioner made a report.
awarding the libellant $50,000. No exceptions having
been filed, the court, on February 20, 1923, affirmed the
report and entered a final decree.
[3] On March 2, 1923, the proctor for the claimant
left in the office of the clerk of the court an order for
the allo\vance of an appeal and at the same time "left
for filing in the office of the said clerk" the information
and suggestion previously presented to the commissioner,
signed and verified by his excellency, Jose d' Alte, envoy
extraordinary and n1inister plenipotentiary of the Republic of Portugal, objecting to the exercise of jurisdic-
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tion by the district court over the Transportes Maritimos
Do Estado as an integral part of the sovereign Government of Portugal. As this information and suggestion
had been signed and verified at Washington more than
a month before the date of the final decree, and as it
was brought to its attention for the first time 10 days
after the date of the final decree, the District Court
refused to regard it as having any bearing on the case.
The claimant now maintains that the District Court
erred in not opening the decree, accepting the suggestion,
and yielding its jurisdiction. Without passing upon any
question of error involved in the refusal of the court to
open the decree and accept the suggestion, it is sufficient
to say that, even if the court had done so, it would not
have availed the claimant or the Republic of Portugal
because the atten1pted suggestion \:<v~as not conformable
with the practice in such cases in that it \vas not presented through the proper official channels. (E x parte
Muir, 254 U. S. 522.)
The suggestion in the ca.se at bar was presented by
the Portuguese minister directly to the court. True,
it \vas accompanied by a certificate of the Secretary of
State to the effect that the minister \vhose name is
subscribed thereto is duly accredited to this Government
as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of
Portugal. As the Supreme Court said in The Pesaro,
255 U. S. 216, "while that established his diplomatic
status it gave no sanction to the suggestion." This is
particularly true in vie\v of a footnote to the certificate
of the Secretary of State that, "For the contents of the
annexed document the departinent assumes no responsibility." In these circumstances "the libellants'
objection that, to be entertained, the suggestion should
come through official channels of the United Stat es \vas
well taken." Ex parte .1l fuir, 254 U. S. 522; United
States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 209; Societa Gommerciale
Italiana di . Nav. v. Maru Nav. Go. (D. C.), 271 F ed. 97;
I d. (C. C. .A.. ) 280 Fed. 334, 335.
On these authorities \\~e are of opinion that the suggestion \vould have b een \Yit hout force had it been
accepted by the court . The scYeral acts of the 'rransportes Mnritimos Do E sta do, the Portuguese vice
consul general at t he port of New. York, and the Portuguese minister at Washington, being b oth tardy and
,,~ithout legal sanct ion, left the claimant "~here it stood
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on its general appearance and, therefore, left undisturbed
the proceedings 'vhich 'vent to final decree.
We find ourselves in full accord 'vith the decision of
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
The Sao Vicente, 281 Fed. 111, in so far as that case
resembles this one. Doubtless apprehending the force
of that decision, based in part on The Carlo Poma, 255
U. S. 219, the appellee moved to dismiss the appeal.
The motion to dismiss the appeal is granted.
Buffington, circuit judge, took no part in this decision.

THE "GUL DJEMAL"
The docket title of this case is: Steamship Gul Djemal, her engines, etc.,· Hu.ssein Lutfi
Bey, master, v. Campbell & Stuart (Inc.).
(264

u. s. 90)

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT
OF NEW YORK
No. 83.

Argued January 4, 1924.-Decided February 18, 1924

The objection that a vessel, owned, possessed, manned, and operated by a foreign State, but engaged in ordinary commerce
under charter to a private trader, is immune to libel in the
District Court for services and supplies, can not be raised
by her master, who, although a naval officer, is not functioning as such, and is not shown to have authority to
represent his sovereign in making the objection.
296 Fed. 567, affirmed.

from a decree of the District Court sustaining a
libel against a ship, for services and supplies.
Mr. William A. Purrington and Mr. John M. Woolsey,
'vith \Vhorn Mr. Frank J. McConnell was on the brief, for
appellant.
Mr. Oscar R. Houston, \vith whom Mr. Ezra G. Benedict Fox \Vas on the brief, for appellee.
~A:r. JusTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the
Court.
or Seeking to recover for supplies and services furnished
at Ne"\v York during November, 1920, in order to fit her
for an intended voyage across the Atlantic, appellee
libeled the steamship Gul Ddemal and caused her arrest
under the ordinary admiralty practice. Her n1aster,
appearing for the sole purpose of objecting to the court's
jurisdiction, claimed immunity for the vessel because
o\vned and possessed by the Turkish Govern1nent, and
APPEAL

Statement
acts.

THE GUL DJERNAL

asked that she be released. No one except the master has
advanced this claim.
The parties stipulated :1 The Turkish Government and
the United States are at peace with each other, but diplo1 "First. That at all the times mentioned in the libel herein, and at the time of the arrest
of the Gul Djemal, the G1tl Djemal was owned by the Turkish or Ottoman Government,
that it flies the Turkish flag; that Turkey has but one flag, for both national and commercial uses; that it is registered in the name of Seire-Seffain administration; that the
Gul Djemal is the absolute property of the Ottoman Seire-Seffain administration, the
third division of the ministry of marine of the Turkish Government, which is attached
to the ministry of war; that the maritime title has been given to the administration
Seire-Seffain by the ministry of war. Said Seire-Seffain administration, at the times
above mentioned, was (and is) the transport section of the ministry of marine, and was
(and is) charged with the control of transport vessels of the Turkish Government, and
said vessels (of which the Gul Djemal was one), which are capable of commercial uses,
are, when not used as transports, used in commerce; whether such vessels are used as
transports or in commerce is subject to the direction of the ministry of marine, which,
through departments other than the Seire-Seffain, has charge of battleships, artillery,
torpedoes, wireless, and engineering work pertaining to all the vessels of the Turkish
Navy; that the Gul Djemal was transferred for operation to the administration SeireSeffain from the ministry of war in 1914 and has since been under the control of admin·
istration of Seire-Seffain.
"Said Seire-Seffain administration, at the times above mentioned, had (and has), as
its head, a military offier of the Turkisk Govenment, in the active or reserve service
of the Turkish Government, and said head must be, at all times, a military officer
in the employ of the Turkish Government, the Seire-Seffain administration being
charged with the transport of troops, and at all the times above mentioned, said head of
the Seire-Seffain administration was a colonel; although said head of the Seire-Seffain administration, at the times above mentioned, was, in respect of the Gul Djemal, not
functioning in a military or naval capacity.
"Second. That at all the times mentioned in the libel herein, and at the time of the
arrest of the Gul Djemal, the Gul Djemal was in the possession of the Turkish Government,
being manned by a master, officers, and crew employed by or under the direction of said
Seire-Seffain administration, and paid by the Treasury Department of the Turkish
Government through the administration Seire-Seffain; said master, at the times above
mentioned, wa5 (and is) a reserve officer in the Turkish Navy employed by the branch
of the ministry of marine known as the administration Seire-Seffain, and the navigating officer was a lieutenant in the active service of the Turkish Navy, both detailed
by the said ministry of marine to serve on the Gul Djemal during the times above mentioned, but in such service they were not performing any naval or military functions,
although they were subject to any orders from the department of the Turkish Government charged with naval or military affairs; the other officers and entire crew of the Gul
Djemal, during the times above mentioned, were civilians, paid by the Turkish Government.
"Third. That at all the times mentioned in the libel herein, and at the time of the
arrest of the Gul Djemal, the Gul Djemaz " was engaged in commercial trade, under
charter for one round voyage to George Dedeoglou, who engaged to carry passengers
and goods ior hire, and in such trade the Gul Djemal was not functioning in a naval or
military capacity, nor was there anything of a naval or military character connected
with the voyage of the Gul Djemal from Constantinople to New York and return.
"Fourth. That the ,..rurkish Government, prior to the time mentioned in the libel
herein, had severed diplomatic relations with the United States of America, advising
its peoples by proclamation, however, that American institutions should not be molested
but should be treated as heretofore; that said diplomatic relations have not been resumed;
although the United States of America maintains unofficial relations with the Turkish
Government by American consular representatives, and through the medium of a high
commissioner; that during said period of the severed relations, the Spanish ambassador
to the United States has represented, and still represents, Turkish interests in the
United States, and bas been recognized as such representative by the Department of
State of the United States of America.
"Fifth. That the Turkish or Ottoman Government, and the Government of the
United States of America, are sovereign governments, and were at all tho times mentioned herein, at peace with each other, although the Turkish or Ottoman Government
was and is an ally of the enemy of the United States in the 'Vorld 'Var."
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matic relations have been severed . The Gul DjP,rrt al is
the absolute property of the Turkish Government and
under the administration of the transport section of the
tm- n1inistry of marine. That government employed and
paid the master, officers, and crew-the n1aster being a
reserve naval officer- and 'vas in possession of the ship
when arrested. She "'vas engaged in commercial trade,
under charter for one round voyage to George Dedeoglou,
who engaged to carry passengers and goods for hire, and
in such trade tlie Gul I}j emal was not functioning in a
naval or military capacity, nor was there anything of a
naval or military character connected with the voyage of
the Gul Djemal from Constantinople to N e'v York and
return.''
The court below denied the alleged immunity and
passed a decree for the libellant. Upon this direct appeal only the question of jurisdiction is presented. The
relevant certificate follows:
"The sole question raised by the answer of the claimant herein, and the sole issue before this court, was the
jurisdiction of the court over the steamship Gul Djernal, a
vessel owned, manned, qperated by and in the possession
of the sovereign Governme~t of Turkey, at peace 'vith
the Government of the United States of America. The
allegations of the libellant that it had furnished supplies
to the vessel, were adn1itted by the claimant, 'vhose
answer set up that the vessel was immune, as a sovereign-o,vned vessel, from the process of this court, and
that the vessel was not within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of this court. I have granted a decree
for the amount prayed for by the libellant, and have
denied immunity to the v~ssel because at the time the
cause of action and liability on which the libel is founded
were created, and at the time the vessel was seized under
process of this court, she was, although owned, manned
by, and in the possession of the sovereign Government
of Turkey, engaged in commercial trade, under charter
for hire to a private trader; and furthermore, because
diplomatic relations between the United States and Turkey were then severed and no appropriate suggestion
was filed from the State Department of the United
States."
Appellee maintains that whatever may be the proper
rule in our courts concerning the ultimate immunity of
vessels owned by foreign governments and employed in
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ordinary trade and commerce, such immunity will not
be granted upon the mere claim of the master, especially
when the United States has no diplomatic relations with
the sovereign owner. Such claim can be made only by
one duly authorized to vindicate the owner's sovereignty.
Ex parte Muir, 254 U. S. 522, 532, 533, is relied upon to
support this view. It is there said" As of right the British Government was entitled to
appear in the suit, to propound its claim to the vessel,
and to raise the jurisdictional question. * * * Or,
with its sanction, its accredited and recognized representative might have appeared and have taken the
same steps in its interest. * * * And, if there was
objection to appearing as a suitor in a foreign court, it
was open to that Government to make the asserted
public status and immunity of the vessel the subject of
diplomatic representations to the end that, if that claim
was recognized by the ~xecutive department of this
Government, it might be set forth and supported in an
appropriate suggestion _to the court by the Attorney
General, or some law officer acting under his direction."
Treating Ex parte Muir as relevant, appellant insists
that within the meaning of the declaration there made
the master of the Gul DJ'emal ' a duly commissioned officer resentatlve.
Accredited rep-of the Turkish Navy, was the accredited and recognized
representative of that Government, possessed of adequate authority to protest against the seizure and object
to the court's jurisdiction.
We agree with the view advanced by the appellee.
The Anne, 3 Wheat. 435, reaffirmed by The Sao Vicente,
260 U.S. 151, is enough to show that the immunity could
not have been successfully set up by a duly recognized
consul, representative of his sovereign in commercial
matters, in the ordinary course of his official duties, and
there seems no adequate reason to presume that the
master of the Gul Djemal had any greater authority in Decision.
respect thereto. Although an officer of the Turkish
Navy, he was performing no naval or military duty, and
was serving upon a vessel not functioning in naval or
military capacity but engaged in commerce under
charter to a private individual \Vho undertook to carry
passengers and goods for hire. He was not shown to
have any authority to represent his sovereign other
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than can be inferred from his position as master andlthe
circumstances specified in the stipulation of.Jacts .
.Affi.rmed.
Mr. Justice Holmes concurs in the result.

THE "WESTERN MAID"
(257

u. s. 419)

Ex parte in the matter of the United States, owner of the American
steamship Western Maid, petitioner
Ex parte in the matter of the United States, former requisitioned
or chartered owner of the auxiliary schooner Liberty, petitioner
Ex parte in the matter of the United States, former requisitioned
and chartered owner of the American steamship Carolinian,
petitioner
PETITIONS

FOR

WRITS

OF

PROHIBITION

AND/OR

~1ANDAMUS

Decided January 3, 1922
1. Neither upon general principle nor under section 9 of the shipping act of September 7, 1916, or section 4 of the "Suits in
Admiralty" act of March 9, 1920, 2 is the United States
liable for a collision committed by a vessel while owned by
it absolutely or pro hac vice and employed by it in public and
government purposes.
2. Held, that a vessel owned by the United States, assigned by the
United States Shipping Board to the \Var Department,
manned by a navy crew and engaged in transporting foodstuffs provided by the Government for the relief of the
civilian population of Europe after the Great 'Var, to be
paid for by the buyer, was not a merchant vessel but a
Pertinent parts of the statutes above mentioned are as follows:
C. 451, sec. 9, 39 Stat. 730: "That any vessel purchased, chartered, or leased from the
[United States Shipping) board may be registered or enrolled and licensed, or both
registered and enrolled and licensed, as a vessel of the United States and entitled to the
benefits and privileges appertaining thereto. * * *
"Every vessel purchased, chartered, or leased from the board shall, unless otherwise
authorized by the board, be operated only under such registry or enrollment and license.
Such vessels while employed solely as merchant vessels shall be subject to all laws, regulations, and liabilities governing merchant vessels, whether the United States be interested therein as owner, in whole or in part, or hold any mortgage, lien, or other interest
therein. No such vessel, without the approval of the board, shall be transferred to a
foreign registry or flag, or sold; nor, except under regulations prescribed by the board,
be chartered or leased. * * *"
C. 95, sec. 4, 41 Stat. 525, 526: "That if a privately owned vessel not in the possession
of the United States or of such [United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet) corporation is arrested or attached upon any cause of action arising or alleged to have arisen from
previous possession, ownership, or operation of such vessel by the United States or by
such corporation, such vessel shall be released without bond or stipulation therefor upon
the suggestion by the United States, through its Attorney General or other duly authorized law officer, that it is interested in such cause, desires such release, and assumes the
liability for the satisfaction of any decree obtained by the libelant in such cause, and
thereafter such cause shall proceed against the United States in accordance with the
provisions of this art ."
2
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vessel engaged in a public service; and that two others,
while let or chartered to the United States on a bare-boat
basis and devoted to military and naval uses were also of
public status.
3. The maritime law is part of the law of the country only in so
far as the United States has made it so, and binds the United
States only in so far as the United States has consented.
4. The United States has not consented to be sued for torts and
therefore it can not be said that, in a legal sense, the United
States has been guilty of a tort.
5. This immunity extends to public vessels of the United States, at
least while employed in operations of Government; and liability for a tort cannot be fastened upon them by the fiction
of a ship's personality, to lie dormant while they remain
with the Government and to become enforceable when they
pass into other hands. The Siren, 7 Wall. 152, and Workman v. New York City, 179 U. S. 552, distinguished.
6. Prohibition lies to restrain the District Court from exceeding its
jurisdiction in admiralty cases.
Rule absolute for writs of prohibition.

Petitions by the United States for writs of prohibition
and mandamus to prevent District Courts from exercising jurisdiction in three proceedings in rem for collisions
that occurred while the vessels libeled were owned absolutely or pro hac vice by the United States and employed
in the public service.
Mr. Solicitor General Beck, with whom Mr. Assistant t ~illif~nf t !0J
Attorney General Ottinger and Mr. J. Frank Staley, states.
special assistant to the Attorney General, were on the
brief, for the United States.
The vessels 'vere all of distinctively public status when
the collisions occurred.
Section 9 of the shipping act has not waived the immunity of the United States or its vessels from suits in
rem for losses arising while they are employed in the war
service. Both the collision loss and the enforcement of
the claim against the· vessel must occur while the Government vessel is employed solely as a merchant vessel, and
then is operating for the account of others than the Government, under charter or lease.
The filing of suggestions under section 4 of the suits in
admiralty act only determines the United States as claimant for the vessel and substitutes its credit for the payment of the decree finally entered, if any, instead of the
usual bond or stipulation for value otherwise entered to
secure the release of a vessel from attachment. The
proceedings continue as proceedings in rem. . Manifestly,
33474-25t-4
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if the libel does not state a cause of action, in re1n against
the vessel, this section can not create one.
Unless there is some magic in such public vessels' personification, the Government can not be held for these
torts. There is no distinction between t.he Government
and its property. There should be no relief by indirection
where Congress has not provided relief directly. Bigby
v. United States, 188 tJ. S. 400, 408; Langford v. United
States, 101 U. S. 341, 344; Gibbons v. United States, 8
Wall. 269, 27 4. Public vessels are part of the sovereign
State and their liabilities are merged in those of the
sovereign. United States v. Ansonia Brass Go., 218 U.S.
452; Board of Commissioners v. 0' Connor, 86 Ind. 531,
537; Rowley v. Conklin, 89 Minn. 172; The Fidelity, 16
Blatchf. 569, 572, 573; The Parle1nent Belge, 4 Asp. 1v1. C.
234, 237, 241; The Prins Frederik, 2 Dads. 451.
The la'v merchant personified the commercial ship not
a public ship. . Commercial vessels are sent in trade to
all ports. Their owners are usually inaccessible for purposes of suit, and their personal responsibilities are uncertain. The necessities of the vessel's operation in merchant
service demand that the vessel, the res, shall be responsible for her torts and contracts. The basis of the law
governing merchant vessels is aid of commerce. Vandewater v. Mills: 19 How. 82; United States v. Brig Malek
Adhel, 2 How. 210; The China, 7 Wall. 53; The Eugene
F . .1lforan, 212 U. S. 466; TheY oung Mechanic, 2 Curtis
404; Holmes, The CommonLa,v, page25; Mayer's Admiralty Law and Practice, page 8. The reason and the
origin of the rule show that it can not apply to public
ships engaged in war service. Cf. Ex parte New York,
No. 1, 256 U. S. 490.
Sovereign immunity includes immunity from lien
liability as well as from process. Ex parte Muir, 254
U.S. 522; Ex parte Hussein Lutfi Bey, 256 U.S. 616; Ex
parte New York, No. 1, 256 U. S. 490; Ex parte Ne'l!J
York, No. 2, 256 U. S. 503; The Davis, 10 Wall. 15; The
Tampico, 16 Fed. 491; Johnson Lighterage Go., 231 Fed.
365; The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall. 213; Kawananakoa
v. Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349; Riddock v. State, 68 Wash.
329; 32 Harv. Law Rev. 447; 30 Harv. Law Rev. 20.
The Siren, 7 Wall. 152, and Workman v. New York City,
179 U. S. 552, distinguished. Cf. Carr v. United States,
98 u. s. 433, 439.

CLAI)\1 FOR OWNERS
1 ,.r.
. wh om .lJ:Lr.
J ames W. R yan owners.
C 1 aim
Mr. T. Gatesby Jones, '\VIth
was on the brief, for respondent in No. 21, Original.
The Western Maid was a merchant vessel at the time
of the collision. The sale of foodstuffs to enemy aliens
is not a necessary function of the sovereign. Indeed, the
act of -February 25, 1919, 40 Stat. 1161, indicates the
opinion of Congress that it was un,vise for the Government to engage in trade with enemy populations. It is
doubtful whether it is constitutional for the Gover.n ment
to engage in transporting foodstuffs to be offered for sale
at destination. United States v. Strang, 254 U. S. 491;
United States Shipping Board v. Wood, 274 Fed. 893.
The collision took place two months after the armistice.
Under such circumstances, the vessel could in no event be
ca.lled a vessel engaged in a military operation. The
Government has the burden of proof to establish that she
was a public vessel engaged in a military operation. Ex
parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522; In re Jupp, 274 Fed. 494, 485.
Even if it were a fact that no freight was to be paid for
the carriage, this circumstance would not affect the case.
It '\Vas intended that her cargo '\vas to be sold to the
civilian population of Europe.
There is no suggestion that the vessel was commissioned. The Exchange, 7 Cr. 116. On the contrary, the
record sho"\\rs that she was registered as a merchant ship,
and it is to be inferred that she was operating under this
registry. (Rev. Stats. sees. 4170, 4171; Navigation Laws
of the United States, 1919, p. 41.)
Congress, by the suits in admiralty act of 1920, has
waived immunity as to merchant vessels. In effect this
is a suit under that act.
If we assume that the Western Maid was a public
vessel at the time of the collision, nethertheless a claim
in favor of the libelant was created against her at that
time, which could be enforced in rem. The Siren, 7
Wall. 152, 13 Wall. 389. The Government contends
that the language in 7 Wall. 155, 156, 158, is a dictum.
When the mem hers of this court, in face of a single dissent, make a doctrine one of the principal grounds for
the court's decision, such a doctrine can hardly be called
a dictum. The Government suggests that, because the
Siren was a prize, the case is distinguishable. This
conclusion does not follow. See Lord, Admiralty Claims,
19 Col. Law Rev. 477.
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As we view the case, The Siren was a decision directly
in point. The proposition relied upon by Mr. Justice
Nelson as a ground for his dissent (7 Wall. 165), viz, that,
if an owner of an offending vessel is not liable, it follows
that there can be no lien, is contrary to the decisions in
The Ohina, 7 Wall. 53; Ralli v. Troop, 157 U. S. 386;
The [!lackheath, 195 U. S. 361; Tucker v. Alexandroff,
183 U. S. 424; The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1; Brig. Malek
Adhel, 2 How. 210; The John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 122;
and The Barnstable, 181 U.S. 464, 467.
Liability in rem is entirely independent of liability in
personam. Homer Ramsdell Go. v. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 182 U. S. 406.
Because of the difference between the American and
English conceptions of the liability of a ship, the English authorities are not in point. The Davis, 10 Wall.
15; The Oarlo Poma, 259 Fed. 369. But even in England it is settled, as was said in Workman v. New York
Oity, 179 U. S. 552, that a collision impresses a liability
on a public vessel which becomes enforcible when the
cro'vn waives the immunity of the public vessel. The
Ticonderoga, 1 Swab. Adm. Rep. 215; Fletcher v. Braddick, 2 Bos. & P. 182.
In Ex parte New York, No. 1, 256 U. S. 490, this court
said that the Workman Oase dealt with a question of the
substantive law of admiralty, not the power to exercise
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
The doctrine of The Davis- and The Siren has long been
familiar to the Federal courts. The Tampico, 16 Fed.
491; Thompson Navigation Go. v. Chicago, 79 Fed. 984;
Johnson Lighterage Go., 231 Fed. 365; The Attualita, 238
Fed. 909; The Luigi, 230 Fed. 493; The Othello, 5
Blatchf. 343.
The Fidelity, 16 Blatchf. 569, was disapproved in
Thompson Navigation Oo. v. Chicago, 79 Fed. 984, and,
so far as its dictum indicated a departure from the doctrine of The Siren and The Davis, was expressly disapproved in Workman v. New York Oity, 179 U. S. 552,
and in The Oeylon Maru, 266 Fed. 396. See also The
U. S. S. Hisko, U. S. S. Roanoke and U. S. S. Pocahontas,
S. D. N. Y., March 17, 1921, Manton, J., (unreported);
The U.S. S. Newark, S.D. N.Y., March 18, 1921, Knox,
J., (unreported); The U. S. S. Sixaola, S. D. N. Y ., April
21, 1921, Mayer, J., (unreported); The F. J. Luckenbach,
267 Fed. 931; The Liberty (unreported); no'v before this
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court; The Carolinian, 270 Fed. 1011. .A.nd see The Florence H, 248 Fed. 1012; The Gloria, 267 Fed. 929; The
City of Philadelphia, 263 Fed. 234; United States v.
Wilder, 3 Sumner, 308, 312.
The principle that the maritime law extends to public
vessels has been recognized by _C9ngress, Act of August
19, 1890, c. 802, 26 Stat. 320; Rev. Stats., sec. 4233; The
Esparta, 160 Fed. 269; The A. A. Raven, 231 Fed. 380.
Cf. Admiralty v. S. S. Eleanor, VI Lloyd's List Law Rep.
456.
It can not be said that the liability arises from the act
of the Government in waiving its immunity from suit.
It existed before this suit; otherwise there could be no
cause of action on v;hich to base the suit. United States
v. Ringgold, 8 Pet. 162; United States v. Lee, 106 lJ. S.
196, 206; Lord, Admiralty Claims, 19 Col. Law Rev. 477;
Hearings, Senate Committee on Commerce, 66th Cong.,
1st sess., on S. 2253, p. 18.
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353, \vas not
a suit in admiralty and the facts were wholly different.
from those in this case. It was not there intended to
modify the doctrine of The Siren, The Davis, and of the·
Ringgold Case, supra.
Mr. Edward E. Blodgett, with whom Mr. Foye M ..
Murphy was on the brief, for respondent in No. 22,
Original.
The burden of proving immunity from the lien is upon
the petitioner. The Tampico. 16 Fed. 491.
The Liberty was subject to a maritime lien arising out
of this collision. The Bold Buccleugh, 7 Moore P. C.
267; The China, 7 Wall. 53; Ralli v. Troop, 157 U. S.
386; Briggs v. Light Boat, 7 Allen, 287; The John G.
Stevens, 170 U. S. 113; Holmes, The Common Law, pp.
26-34; The Little Charles, 1 Brock. 34 7; The Palmyra,
12 Wheat. 1; United States v. Brig jlfalek Adhel, 2 Ho\v.
210; The John Fraser, 21 I-Io,v. 184; The Jferrimac, 14
Wall. 199; The Clarita, 23 Wall. 1; The Barnstable, 181
U. S. 464; The Luigi, 230 Fed. 493; Johnson Lighterage
Go., ·231 Fed. 365.
The lien arises though the vessel be owned, manned,
and operated by a sovereign for 'va.r purposes. United
States v. Wilder, 3 Su1nner, 308; The Davis, 10 Wall. 15;
The Siren, 7 Wall. 152; Work1nan v. New York City, 179
U. S. 552; The Florence H, 248 Fed. 1012; The Gloria,
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267 Fed. 929; The F. J. Luckenbach, 267 Fed. 931; The
City of Philadelphia, 263 Fed. 234.
The property of a sovereign is not im1nune from preexisting maritime liens. Briggs v. Light Boat, supra;
United States v. Wilder, supra; The St. Jago de Cuba, 9
Wheat. 416; The Copenhagen, 1 C. Rob. Adm. 289.
The petitioner by the act of March 9, 1920, has impliedly admitted that a lien may be created upon vessels
owned or operated by it.
In England, technical immunity attaches to all property owned by the crown, irrespective of whether or not
it is in possession of the sovereign. The Broadmayne,
L. R. [1916] P. D. 64; The Scotia, [1903] A. C. 501.
But the lords co1nmissioners of the admiralty represent
the crown, and have a discretionary power, freely exercised, to waive the privileges of the crown and consent to
jurisdiction. The Fidelity, 16 Blatchf. 569; United States
v. New York & OrientalS. S. Go., 216 Fed. 61; Thompson
Navigation Go. v. Chicago, 79 Fed. 984; United States v.
Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 208; Homer Ramsdell Go. v. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 182 U. S. 406. Furthermore, the personification of the res is not carried so far
in England as in the United States. In the former the
procedure in rem is used merely as a means to compel the
appearance of the respondent, and judgment runs against
the individual-the seizure of the res is incidental. The
Parlement Belge, 5 P. D. 197.

Mr. Charles S. Haight, with who1n Mr. Wharton Poor
was on the brief, for respondent in No. 23, Original.
The case of the Carolinian is materially different from
that of the Western ~!aid and other cases, \Vhere at the
time of the collision title to the ship was in the Government.
The officers in command of the Oarol·inian \Vhen this
collision occurred, while imposed upon the ship by the
authority of the Government under the act of June 15,
1917, occupied no different position from the compulsory
pilot imposed upon the China. (7 Wall. 53.) The John
G. Stevens, 170 U. S. 113; Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183
U.S. 424; Workman v. New York Oity, 179 U.S. 552.
The decisions show that in order to sustain a suit in
rem for collision only two conditions need exist: (1)
Fault on the part of the navigators, and (2) the ability
of the court to execute its process by seizure.

EXEMPTION FR.OM LIEN

The attributes of sovereignty do not inure to the
benefit of private individuals. Moran v. Horsky, 178
u.s. 205.
That a national war vessel may be held in fault for a
collision due to the negligence of her officers and crew
\vas directly decided in The Sapphire, 11 Wall. 164.
Even if, at the time of the collision, the Carolinian
had been owned by the United States, an inchoate lien
would nevertheless have been created which could be
enforced in the present suit. The Florence H, 248 Fed.
1012; The F. J. Luckenbach, 26 7 Fed. 931; The Gloria,
267 Fed. 929; The Ceylon Maru, 266 Fed. 396; Johnson
Lighterage Go., 231 Fed. 365; The Tampico, 16 Fed. 491;
United States v. Wilder, 3 Sumner, 308; The City of
Philadelphia, 263 Fed. 234; The Siren, 7 Wall. ~52; The
Davis, 10 Wall. 15; Workman v. New York Oi,ty, 179
u.s. 552.
The only basis on which the exemption of Government property from such a lien can be rested is the
medireval doctrine of "prerogative," which forms no
part of our jurisprudence. Dollar Savings Bank v.
United States, 19 Wall. 227; United States v. lYilder,
supra.
Nor is there any principle of public policy "rhich prevents the creation of a maritime lien against a public
vessel owned by the United States. When the privately
owned vessel is at fault, the United States collects its
damages from the ship or her o"\vners, and it is only fair
that a private owner should have a like right when the
Government ship is to blame. Congress has recognized
this principle of equality by 1naking the statutory rules
for preventing collisions at sea binding upon public ships
as well as private, 26 Stat. 320; 28 Stat. 645; 2 Fed.
Stat. Ann., 2d ed., 376, 402, 449. If a merchant ship
and a war ship are equally at fault, the damages are
divided. The Sapphire, supra.
The justice of paying clailns arising out of collisions for
which public vessels were at fault has always been recognized by Congress through many special acts allo,ving
claims.
The doctrine of the immunity of the sovereign from
suit-to "\Vhich so many exceptions have been made by
statute as almost do a\vay with the rule-is based not
upon principle but upon precedent. United States v.
Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 206; United States v. Emery Bird
Thayer Realty Go., 237 U. S. 28, 32. 1"'his is evidenced
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by the practical relief from it in collision cases afforded
in England, France, Germany, and in the State of N e'v
York.
The act of March 9, 1920, is; an express recognition by
Congress that a maritime lien may: exist against a public
vessel even though used solely for governmental purposes,
and as the United States has secured the release of the
Carolinian under this act it can not no'v contend that the
court is without jurisdiction.
Op i nion
court.

Statement

fact.

1~r.

Justice HoLMES delivered the opinion of the court.
These are petitions for prohibition to prevent district
courts of the United S~ates from exercising jurisdiction of
proceedings in rem for collisions that occurred while the
vessels libeled were owned, absolutely or pro hac vice, by ·
the United States, and employed in the public service.
The questions arising in the three cases are so nearly the
same that they can be dealt with together.
of
The Western Maid was and is the property of the
United States. On January 10, 1919, she was allocated by
the United States Shipping Board to the War Department
for service as a transport. She had been loaded with
foodstuffs for the relief of the civilian population of
Europe, to be delivered on arrival at Falmouth, England,
to the order of the~Food Administration Grain Corporation, the consignor, American Embassy, London, care of
the chief quartermaster, American Expeditionary Forces,
France; subject to the direction of Mr. Hoover. If it
should prove impracticable to reship or redirect to the
territories lately held by the Central Empires, Mr.
Hoover was to resell to the Allied Governments or to the
Belgian Relief; the foodstuffs to be paid for by the buyer.
The vessel was manned by a Navy crew. Later on the
same day, January 10, 1919, in the New York Harbor,
the collision occurred. On March 20, 1919, the vessel
was delivered to the United States Shipping Board. The
libel was filed on November 8, 1919. Act of September
7, 1916, c. 451, sec. 9, 39 Stat. 728, 730. The Lake Mon . .
roe, 250 U. S. 246. On February 20, 1920, the Government moved that it be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The district court overruled the motion. On April 11,
1921, the Attorney General moved for leave to file the
present petition in this court. Leave was gran ted and
the case has been heard.

of

THE LIBERTY AND THE CAROLINIAN

41

The Liberty was a pilot boat let to the United States
on the bare-boat basis at a nominal rate of hire. She had
been manned by a crew from the United States Navy and
commissioned as a naval dispatch boat, and was employed
to serve military needs in war service. rrhe collision took
place on December 24, 1917, while she was so employed, in ·
Boston Harbor. Afterwards the vessel was redelivered to
the owners, and still later, on February 5, 1921, the suit
now in question "ras brought against her. On February
14, under the act of March 9, 1920 (c. 95, sec. 4, 41 Stat.
525), the United States filed a suggestion of its interest,
and also set up the above facts. The district court held
that they constituted no defense, and this petition was
brought by the Attorney General along with that last
mentioned.
The steamship Carolinian had been chartered to the
United States upon a ~are-boat charter and had been
assigned to the War Department, by which she \Vas
employed as an Army transport and furnished \vi th an
Army crew. While she was so employed the collision
took place in the harbor of Brest, France, on February 15,
1918. Afterwards the Carolini-an \Vas returned to the
ovvrners and she was employed solely as a merchant vessel
on July 9, 1920, when the suit in question was begun,
under which the vessel \Vas seized. In the same month
the United States filed a suggestion of interest and on
January 6, 1921, set up the foregoing facts . and prayed
that the libel be dismissed. The District Court· maintained its jurisdiction and this petition was brought by
the Attorney General along with the other t\vo. (270
Fed. 1011.)
It may be assumed that each of these vessels might Liability of the
have been libeled for maritime torts committed after the United States.
redelivery that we have mentioned. But the· act of September 7, 1916 (c. 451, sec. 9), does not create a liability
on the part of the United States, retrospectively, \Vhere
one did not exist before. Neither, in our opinion, is such
a liability created by the act of March 9, 1920 (c. 95,
sec. 4), authorizing the United States to assume the
defense in suits like these. It is not required to abandon
any defense that otherwise \Vould be good. It appears
to us plain that before the passage of these acts neither
the United States nor the vessels in the hands of the
United States were liable to be sued for these alleged
maritime torts. The Liberty and the Carolinian \Vere
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employed for public and Government purposes and were
o~Nned pro hac vice by the United States. It is suggested
that the lVestern Maid was a merchant vessel at the time
of the collision, but the fact that the food \Vas to be paid
for and the other details adverted to in argu1nent can not
disguise the obvious truth that she was engaged in a
public service that \Vas one of the constituents of our
activity in the \Var and its sequel and that had no more
to do \Vi th ordinary merchandizing than if she had carried a regiment of troops. The only question really open
to debate is whether a liability attached to the ships
which, although dormant while the United States \Vas in
possession, became enforcible as soon as the vessels came
in to hands that could be sued.
law.
In deciding this question we must realize that however
ancient may be the traditions of maritime Ia,v, however
diverse the sources from which it has been dra\vn, it derives its \vhole and only power in this country from its
having been accepted and adopted by the United States.
There is no mystic overlaw to which even the United
States must bow. When a case is said to be governed by
foreign law or by general maritime law, that is only a
short way of saying that for this ·purpose the sovereign
power takes up a rule suggested from \Vithout and makes
it part of its own rules. The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558,
571, 572. Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. Cons. 54, 58,
59. Dicey, . Conflict of La,vs, 2d ed., 6, 7. Also we must
realize that the authority that makes the law is itself
superior to it, and that if it consents to apply to itself the
rules that it applies to others the consent is free and may
be withheld. The sovereign does not create justice in an
ethical sense, to be sure, and there may be cases in \vhich
it would not dare to deny that justice for fear of war or
revolution. Sovereignty is a question of power, and no
human power is unlimited. Carino v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, 212 U.S. 449, 458. But
from the necessary point of view of the sovereign and its
organs whatever is enforced by it as law is enforced as the
expression of its will. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205
U. S. 349, 353.
The United States has not consented to be used for
torts, and therefore it can not be said that in a legal sense
the United States has been guilty of a tort. For a tort is
a tort in a legal sense only because the law has made it so.
If then we i1n agine the sovereign power announcing the

LEGAL OBLIGATIONS

system of its laws in a single voice it is hard to c~nceive
it as declaring that "\vhile it does not recognize the possibllity of its acts being a legal wrong and while its immunity from such an imputation of course extends to its
property, at least when employed in carrying on the operations of the Government-specifically appropriated to
national objects, in the language of Buchanan v. Alexander, 4 How. 20-yet if that property passes into other
hands, perhaps of an innocent purchaser, it may be seized
upon a claim that had no existence before. It may be said
that the persons who actually did the act complained of
may or might be sued and that the ship for this purpose
is regarded as a person. But that is a fiction, not a fact,
and as a fiction is the creation of the law. It would be a
strange thing if the law created a fiction to accomplish
the result supposed. It is totally immaterial that in dealing with private wrongs, the fiction, ho,vever originated,
is in force. See Liverpool, Brazil cf~ River Plate Steam
Navigation Co. v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal,
251 U. S. 48, 53. The personality of a public vessel is
merged in that of the sovereign. The Fidelity, 16
Blatchf, 569, 573. Ex parte State o_f New York, No. 2 ,
256 U. S. 503.
But it is said that the decisions have recognized that
an obligation is created in the case before us. Legal obligations that exist but can not be enforced are ghosts that
are seen in the law but that are elusive to the grasp. The
leading authority relied upon is The Siren, 7 Wall. 152.
The ground of that decision was that "\vhen the United
States came into court to enforce a claim it vvould be
. assumed to submit to just claims of third persons in
respect of the same subject-matter. 7 Wall. 154. Carr v.
United States, 98 U. S. 433, 438. In reaching its result
the court spoke of such claims as unenforcible liens, hut
that was little more than a mode of expressing the consent
of the sovereign power to see full justice done in such
circumstances. It would have been just as effective and
more accurate to speak of the claims as ethical only, but
recognized in the interest of justice wh en the sovereign
came into court. They \Vere treated in this 'vay by Dr.
Lushington in The Athol, 1 vVm. Rob . 374, 382. Further
distinctions have been taken that need not be adverted to
here. There was nothing decided in lVorkman v. NevJ
York City, 179 U. S. 552, that is contrary t o our conclusion, which, on the other hand, is favored by The Fidelity,
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16 ]3latchf. 569, 573, and Ex parte State of New York,
No. 1, 256 U. S. 490, and Ex parte State of New Yorlc,
No. 2, 256 U. S. 503. The last cited decisions also sho\v

that a prohibition may be granted in a case like this.
See The Ira M. Hedges, 218 U. S. 264, 270.
Rule absolute for writs of prohibition.
Mr. Justice McReynolds did not hear the argument
in this case and took no part in the decision.
~~ssenting
Mr • Justice McKenna ' with whom concurred Mr •
opmwns.
Justice Day and Mr. Justice Clarke, dissenting.
The question in the cases is without complexity, and
the means of its solution ready at hand. 'fhe question is,
What is the law applicable to colliding vessels and \vhat
remedy is to be applied to the offending one, if there be
an offending one? The question, I venture to say, has
unequivocal answer in a number of decisions of this court
if they be taken at their word. And why should they
not be? That they have masqueraded in a double sense,
can not be assumed; that they have successively justified
implications adverse to their meaning would be a matter
of wonder.
What then do they express to be the la\v of colliding
vessels, the assignment of offence, if offence there be,
and how far is it dependent, if at all, upon whether the
offender was in public or private service?
Admiralty iu·
The answer may be immediate. This court has kept
risdiction
steadily in mind that the admiralty jurisprudence of the
country, as adopted by the Constitution, has a distinctive
individuality, and this court has felt the necessity of
keeping its principles in definite integrity, and the r medies intact by which its principles can alone be realized ..
The most prominent and efficient of its remedies is that
which subjects its instrumentalities, its ships particularly,
to judgment. Personality is assigned to them and they
are considered to pledge to indemnify any da1nage inflicted through them. They are made offenders and have
the responsibility of offenders, and the remedy is suited
to the purpose. In Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry &
Machine Co., 237 U. S. 303, 306, it is said, Mr. Justice
Hughes delivering the opinion of the court, "The proceeding in rem which is within the exclusive jurisdiction
of admiralty is one essentially against the vessel itself
as the debtor or offending thing,-in which the vessel is
itself 'seized and impleaded as the defendant, and is
judged and sentenced accordingly.'"

COLLISION LIABILITY

In the John G. Stevens, 170 U. S. 113, 120, the court,
through Mr. Justice Gray, declared, "The foundation of
the rule that collision gives to the party injured a jus in re
in the offending ship is the principle of the maritime la'v
that the ship, by whomsoever owned, or navigated, is considered as herself the wrongdoer, liable for the tort, and
subject to a maritime lien for the damages. This principle, as has been observed by careful text writers on both
sides of the Atlantic, has been more clearly established
and more fully carried out, in this country than in England. Henry on Admiralty, section 75, note; Marsden
on Collisions (3d ed.) 93." The case in many ways and
by many citations fortifies and illustrates the principle. 5
The Siren was cited and the fact is pertinent as 've
shall presently see. The China, 7 Wall. 53, was also cited
and quoted from. The quotation was repeated in Ralli
v. Troop, 157 U. S. 386, 402, 403, where it is said that the
liability of a vessel is not derived from the authority or
agency of those on board, either under the civil or common law," but upon a distinct principle of maritime law,
namely, that the vessel, in whosesoever hands she la,vfully is, is herself considered as the 'vrongdoer, liable for
the tort, and subject to a maritime lien for the damages.
In Tucker v. Alexandrojf, 183 U.S. 424, 438, this court
by Mr. Justice Brown gave graphic representation to the
same principle. He described a ship prior to her launching as ''a, mere congeries of wood and iron '' but after
launching she took on a name, a personality of her o'vn
and had in a sense volition, became competent to contract
and be contracted with, sue and be sued, could have
agents of her own, was capable of committing a tort and
was pledged to its reparation. Cases were cited, the
Siren among others.
The doctrine thus explicitly announced is denied application in the pending cases and upon what grounds~ As
I understand, the contention is that a vessel has not independent guilt, that there must be fault in its o'vner or
operator, his fault becoming its fault. This has been said,
but it puts out of view her character as bail and that the
innocent victim of the injury she has inflicted shall not
'General Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sherwood, 14 How. 351, 363; The Creole, 2 Wall.
Jr. 485, 518; The .J.lfayurka, 2 Curtis, 72, 77; The Younq lrfechanic, 2 Curtis, 404; Tbe
Kiersaqe, 2 Curtis, 421; The Yankee Blade, 19 How. 82, 89; The Rock Island Fridqe,
6 Wall. 213, 215; The China, 7 'Vall. 53, 68; The Siren, 7 Wall. 152, 155; Thr. Lottawar111a,
21 Wall. 558, 579; The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U.S. 1, 10, 11, 20; The Glid.•, 167 U.S. 606.
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be remitted to the insufficient or evasive responsibility of
persons but shall have the security of the tangible and
available value of the thing. And this responsibility and
fullness of indemnity we have seen it was declared in the
John G. Stevens, supra, distinguished the law of this
country from that of England.
But if the contention were conceded it would not determine these cases. I reject absolutely that because the
Government is exempt from suit it can not be accused of
fault. Accountability for wrong is one thing, the wrong
is another.
But I do not have to beat about in general reasoning.
I may appeal to the authority of the Siren, 7 Wall. 152
and the cases that have approved and followed it. A
gloss is attempted to be put upon it-which we think is
unjustified and inaccurate unless, indeed, it can be as. serted that the writer of the opinion did not know the
meaning of the words he used, and, that the members of
the court who concurred with him, were equally deficient
in understanding. And their insensibility to \vhat the
words conveyed had no excuse. A dissenting justice
tried to bring their comprehensive in1port to understanding, proclaimed indeed, that the words had the extent
and consequence that the court now says wer~~ not
intended or accomplished.
The Siren, while in charge of a prize master and crew.,
having been taken in prize by the United States, ran into
in the port of New York and sank the sloop Harper. The
collision was regarded by the court as the fault of the
Siren. She was condemned as prize and sold and the
proceeds deposited with the Assistant Treasurer of the
United States. The owners of the Harper asserted a
claim upon her and her proceeds for the damages sustained by the collision. The District Court rejected the
claim. Its action was reversed by this court.
The United States was an actor in the case and this
was regarded by the court, who spoke by Mr. Justice
Field, as removing the impediment to the clailn of the
owners of the Harper. It was not, however, the basis
of recovery. There 'vas no confusion in the language or
conception of the learned justice, nor in the court, of
that. By becoming the actor, the United States, it was
said, waived its exemption from direct suit and opened
"to consideration all claims and equities in regard to the

DISTINCTION IN LIABILITIES

property libelled ''-not, of course, that the waiver of
exemption created the "claims and equities." They, it
was explicitly said, were created against the offending
vessel by the collision. '' In such case,'' the language
was, "the claim exists equally as if the vessel belonged to
a private citizen, but for reasons of public policy, already
stated, can not be enforced by direct proceedings against
the vessel." And again, ''The inability to enforce the
claim against the vessel is not inconsistent with its
existence."
The distinction was clearly made between exemption
of the United States, the offense of the vessel and the
existence of a claim aga!nst it in consequence of its
offense. And the distinction was emphasized in the dissent of Mr. Justice Nelson. He was at pains to distinguish between liability to suit and legal liability for the
act of injury, the ground of suit. And the basis of his
dissent was the same as the basis of the opinion of the
court in the present cases, but not so epigrammatically
expressed. In the opinion in these cases it is said that
"the United States has not consented to be sued for torts,
and therefore it can not be said that in a legal.sense, the
United States has been guilty of a tort. For a tort is a
tort in a legal sense only because the la\v has made it so."
Mr. Justice Nelson was more discursive. He said that
"if the owner of the offending vessel [he regarded the
Siren as owned by the United States] is not liable at all
for the collision, it follows, as a necessary legal consequence, that there can be no lien, otherwise the nonliability would amount to nothing." And again, "if the
Government is not responsible, upon the principles of the
common law, for wrongs committed by her officers or
agents, then, whether the proceedings in the admiralty are
against the vessel, or its proceeds, the court is bound to
dismiss them.'' And giving point to this view the learned
justice observed that "no principle at common law is
better settled than that the Government is not liable for
the wrongful acts of her public agents."
I repeat, that in view of these extracts from Mr. Justice
Nelson's dissent, misapprehension of its opinion by the
court is not conceivable nor carelessness of utterance.
Yet the opinion in the present cases practically so asserts
and, in effect, regards Mr. Justice Nelson's dissent as the
la\V of the Siren and not that which the court pronounced.
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The court decided that the vessel was the offending thing,
and though it could not be reached in the hands of the
Government, this "inability to enforce the claim against
the vessel" was "not inconsistent with its existence."
'fhe inevitable deduction is that in such situation the
enforcement of a claim is suspended only, and when the
vessel passes from the hands of the Government, as the
offending vessels have in the cases at bar, they and "all
claims and equities in regard to" them may be enforced.
The case was commented on in The Davis, 10 Wall. 15,
20, and the gloss now put upon it rejected. It is there
said that the 'veil-supported doctrine of the case is "that
proceedings in rem to enforce a lien against property of
the United States are only forbidden in cases where, in
order to sustain the proceeding, the possession of the
United States must be invaded under process of the
court."
So again in Workman v. New York Oity, 179 U. S. 552,
where it is said, Chief Justice White delivering the opinion
of the court, after an exhaustive review of cases, such as
he usually gave, "It results that, in the maritime law, the
public nature of the service upon which a vessel is engaged
at the time of the commission of a maritime tort affords
no immunity fron1 liability in a court of admiralty, where
the court has jurisdiction." In view of this it is difficult
to understand how it can be said that there was nothing
that case decided contrary to the conclusion in these cases.
Against this array of cases and their reasoning, Ex parte
State of New York, No. 2, 256 U. S. 503, and Ex parte
State of New York, No. 1, 256 U. S. 490, are adduced.
Neither case has militating force. The latter case decided
nothing but that a State can not be sued without its consent. An indisputable proposition which this court in its
opinion had to clear from confusing or disturbing circumstances. In the former case, The Queen City, a steam
tug, was in the possession and service of the State of New
York and to have awarded process against it as the district court did, "\Vould have arrested the service. This
court rightfully reversed that action. The tug had not
been released from that immunity as the vessels were in
the pending cases.

THE CHARLOTTE

Counsel for claimants in opposition to the petition cite
cases at circuit and district "rhich follo,ved The Siren. 4
It is not necessary to revie"\v or comment upon them.
They are testimony of what the judiciary of the country
considered and consider The Siren and other cases decided.
Therefore we can not refrain from saying that it is strange,
that notwithstanding the language of The Siren, its understanding and acceptance in many cases in this court, the
enforcement of its doctrine at circuit and district, it should
now be declared erroneous. The cases at bar "\Vould seem
to be cases for the application of the maxim of stare decisis
which ought to have force enough t"o resist a change based
on finesse of reasoning or attracted by the possible accomplishment of a theoretical correctness.
The rules should be discharged .

.

THE "CHARLOTTE"
(299 F. 595)

CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, SECOND CIRCUIT
April 28, 1924

Before HOUGH, MANTON, and MAYER, Circuit
Judges.
PER CuRIAM: This is the same litigation which gave
rise to the proceedings in Ex parte New York No. 1, 256

u.s. 491.

The Charlotte, owned by claimants herein, was by a
document called a charter and lease, in the employment
of the State of New York and used by the authority of
that State in towing on the Erie Canal. Libelant asserts
by this suit in rem that she was negligently navigated to
the injury of his barge or canal boat. The question here
is whether this action can be maintained under the author4 The U.S. S. Hisko, U. S. S. Roanoke, and U.S. S. Pocahontas (Circuit Judge :Manton
S. D. N. Y.) (March 17, 1921, unreported opinion annexed to brief);
The U. S. S. Newark (District Judge Knox, S.D. N.Y.) (March 18, 1921, unreported
opinion annexed to brief);
The U. S. S. Sixaola (District Judge 1\iayer, S. D. N.Y.) ·(April 21, 1921, unreported
opinion annexed to brief);
The F. J. Luckenbach, 267 Fed. 931; The Liberty, now before this court; The Carolinian,
270 Fed. 1011, also now before this court.
Also: The Florence li., 248 Fed. 1012; The Gloria, 267 Fed. 929; The City of Philadel·
phia, 263 Fed. 234.
Counsel also cites: The Tampico, 16 Fed. 491; Thompson Navigation Co. v. C1ty of
Chicago, 79 Fed. 984; Johnson Lighterage Co., 231 Fed. 3G5; The Attualita, 238 Fed. 909;
The Luigi, 230 Fed. 493; The Othello, 5 Dlatchf. 343.
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ity of the case above cited, of The Queen City (Ex parte
.IVew York No. 2) 256 U. S. 503, and The Western Maid,
257 u. s. 419.
[I] Nothing need be added to the opinion of the court
below in respect of its holding that the charter and lease
of the Charlotte existing at the time of the alleged negligence was a demise of the vessel and made the State of
New York her owner pro hac vice.
ImmunityN of
The first case cited above shows that no action in
State or
ew
York.
personam would lie against the State of New York in the
admiralty for the damage complained of; The Queen City
shows that if the Charlotte had been owned absolutely
by the State, no action in rem could have been maintained
against the vessel; and the lVestern ]faid shows that in
respect of the sovereign United States there is no difference between a vessel owned outright and one owned
pro hac vice by the sovereign.
[2] This reduces the question at bar to an inquiry
whether there is any difference between the sovereignty
of the United States and that of the State of New York
in so far as its immunity from suits of this kind is concerned.
The general nature of a State's sovereignty has been
too often set forth to require additional exposition now;
it is summarily stated with due citation of authorities in
36 Cyc. 828.
It is thought that no State has been more insistent
upon the extent of its sovereign powers than the State of
New York, and that sovereignty has recently received
full recognition in Marshall v. People of the State of New
York, 254 U. S. 380, where all the New York cases are
cited. We think it unnecessary to do more than state
our acceptance of the proposition that in the absence of
any diminution of power in this regard by the Constitution of the United States, the State of New York can
neither be sued in personam for the tort complained of,
nor can its property, whether absolute or owned pro hac
vice, be made to respond for the same tort. In other
words, the doctrine of Western ]laid, supra, applies to and
governs this case.
Decree affirmed, with costs.

THE PORTO ALEXANDRE

THE "PORTO Al,EXANDRE"
([1920], p. 30)

Admiralty-Public vessel-Immunity from process of arrest-Trading by public vessel
A vessel owned or requisitioned by a sovereign independent state
and earning freight for the state, is not deprived of the
· privilege, decreed by international comity, of immunity
from the process of arrest, by reason of the fact that she
is being employed in ordinary trading voyages carrying
cargoes for private individuals.
The Parlement Belge (1880) 5 P. D. 197 considered and applied.

from a decision of Hill J. setting aside the
writ in rem and all subsequent proceedings against the
steamship Porto Alexandre.
The Porto Alexandre, formerly the German-owned
steamship lngbert, a vessel of 2,699 tons gross, by a
decree of the Portuguese prize court of January 30, 1917,
was adjudged a lawful prize of war. She had previously
been requisitioned by the Portuguese Government and
handed over to the Commission of Services of Transports
Maritims and was being employed in ordinary trading
voyages earning freight for the Government.
In September, 1919, she loaded a cargo of cork shavings
for carriage to Liverpool under a hill of lading from which
it appeared that the cargo was shipped by and consigned
to the Portuguese Import and Export Co., (Ltd.).
On September 13, when in the Crosby Channel at the
en trance to the Mersey, the vessel got agrou'nd and
salvage services were rendered to her by three Liverpool
tugs, the Nora, Expert, and Torfreda. On September 16
a writ in rem was issued on behalf of the owners, masters,
and crews of these tugs in respect of the services against
"the owners of the Portuguese steamship Porto Alexandre
.
'
her cargo and freight." On September 24 the solicitors
for the defendants accepted service of the writ and
undertook to appear on behalf of the cargo owners, anrl
on September 25 entered appearance "under protest"
for the owners and freight. On October 2 a motion was
set down to set aside the writ and all subsequent proceedings on the ground that the Porto Alexandre and the
freight "were and are the public national property of
and/or requisitioned by and in the possession and public
use and service of the Portuguese Government." The
motion came before Hill, J., on October 20 and 27, 1919,
and was supported by a communication from the
APPEAL
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Portuguese charge d ' affaires to Lord Curzon, the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who in turn communicated it to the learned judge, that the Porto Alexandre
was ''a state-owned vessel belonging to the Government of the Portuguese Republic."
Hill, J., in giving judgment said that he had arrived at
his decision with the greatest reluctance. Upon the ·f acts
he was prepared to find, if it were necessary, that the
Porto Alexandre was being used in ordinary commerce,
and that the only interest of the Portuguese Government
was in the earning of freight. But in his view the law
as laid down in The Parlement Belge 5 was that a sovereign
state could not be impleaded either by being ·served in
personam or indirectly by proceedings against its property; and if that were the principle it mattered not how
the property was being employed. His lordship continued: "I think, therefore, that this motion succeeds
upon the ground that it is established that this ship was
· the property of the Portuguese Government at the time
of arrest and is now its property. It therefore follo\vs
that so far as the ship and freight are concerned the "\vrit
and all subsequent proceedings must be set aside, but the
vrrit and all subsequent proceedings so far as the cargo
is concerned will remain good. I have already, in previous cases, pointed out what I conceive to be very strong
reasons why it is undesirable that cases should be withdrawn, as this is being withdrawn, from the courts, but I
have only to assert now what I conceive to be the la,v."
The plaintiffs appealed.
th!r:fi~~t;,or
November 10. C. R. Dunlop, K. C., and J. B. Aspinall
for the appellants. Although a sovereign ruler can not
be impleaded even in respect of private transactions,
international comity does not extend the same immunity
to the property of states unless employed in the public
service. The decision of the court of appeal in The Parlement Belge 5 no doubt qualifies to some extent the vie"rs
of Sir Robert Phillimore as expressed in the court below
in that case 6 and in The Oharkieh. 7 But the court of
appeal, in reversing Sir Robert Phillimore, took a different view of the facts, and the case is not an authority for
the proposition that a foreign state-o,vned merchant ship
6

5 P. D. 197.

e (1879) 4 P. D. 129.

7

(1873) L. R. 4 A. & E. 59, 74.

SALVAGE

engaged on an ordinary mercantile voyage is immune
from the process of arrest. The Parlement Belge was a
mail boat, and although carrying passengers and cargo
this was merely ancillary to her real employment, 'vhich
was that of carrying the Belgian State mails. The correct view was that stated by Marshall, C. J., in an old
American authority (U.S. Bank v. Planters' Bank 8 ), that
"when a Government becomes a partner in any trading
company it devests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character." [The
Prins Frederik 9 was also referred to.]
D. Stephens, K. C., and .._t\.. W. Grant for the respondents were not called on.
BANKES, L. J.: This is an appeal from a decision of
Hill, J., '\vho made an order that the writ and warrant for
arrest, and all subsequent proceedings against the Porto
Alexandre and freight, be set aside, but the proceedings
against the cargo should stand. The learned judge was
only concerned with the question of the ship, and this
appeal has only reference to the ship.
The vessel in question was on a voyage from Lisbon to
Liverpool, and she ran aground in the Mersey, and three
tugs were engaged to get her off. An action was brought,
and the ship was arrested in respect of the services rendered to her by these tugs. The application '\vhich the
learned judge granted was founded upon the contention
that the vessel was the property of a sovereign state, the
Republic of Portugal, and on that ground, that she \vas
exempt from arrest. The conclusion of fact at which the
learned judge arrived '\vas that it had been established
that the ship was the property of the Portuguese Government at the time of the arrest, and is still their property,
and on that ground he made the order.
It is now contended that it is not sufficient for a sovereign or a sovereign state to allege that a vessel is the
property of such ~overeign or sovereign state, and that
the allegation must go further and say the vessel is
employed in the public service or on public service.
The facts with regard to the vessel are as follo'\vs: She statement
· · 11 y a German mere h ant vessel, and In
. August, facts.
was or1g1na
191(1, she was requisitioned by the Portuguese Government.
On August 11 what is called· a passport was issued, '\vhich
authorized the employment of the vessel and contains
s (1824) 9 Wheat. 904, 907.

g

(1820) 2 Dods. 451.
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notes upon it, indicating that during the period that the
vessel \Vas at the service of the Portuguese Government,
for which she was requisitioned, her port of register
should be Lisbon. There is also an indorsement on the
passport stating that on January 30, 1917, she was adjudged a lawful prize of war. Mr. Dunlop has pointed
out that the statement that she was adjudged a la\vful
prize of war leaves it doubtful whether she has become
the actual property of the Portuguese Government, or
whether she \vas merely detained pending the conclusion
of peace. It would rather appear that the latter is the
proper conclusion, because there is an affidavit by the
Portuguese vice consul at Liverpool, who says that the
vessel is, and has been, requisitioned by the Portuguese
Government for the service of the State, and is employed
under the orders of the Government. There is a further
statement in writing by the Portuguese consul at Liverpool, in which he says in reference to this particular
voyage that the freight on the cargo was paid before
shipment and belongs solely and entirely to the Portuguese Government. In addition to that, there is a letter
fro1n the Portuguese charge d'affaires, in ,vhich he states
definitely that the Porto Alexandre is a public service
vessel belonging to the Portuguese Government.
There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of the statements that have been made on affidavit in .this casethat the vessel has been requisitioned under the order of
the Portuguese Government, and that on the particular
voyage she \vas carrying freight for that Government.
Mr. Dunlop, however, contends that is not sufficient,
because it is shown she 'vas engaged in ,vhat he says 'vas
an ordinary commercial undertaking, as an ordinary
trading vessel carrying goods for a private individual or
a private con1pany. The question is, 'vhether it is possible in the circumstances of this case to distinguish it.
from The Parlement Belge, 10 \vhich wa~ a decision of this
court, and is binding upon us.
I gather from the judgment of Hill, J., and from 'vhat
has been said by learned counsel, that this question is
becoming one of growing i1nportance. In the days 'vhen
the early decisions 'vere given, no doubt ,vhat 'vere
called Gov-ern1nent vessels 'vere confined almost entirely,
if not exclusively, to vessels of 'var. But in n1odern
ti1nes sovereigns and sovereign states have taken to
to !i P. D. 197.

THE PAR.LEMENT BELGE

o'vning ships, 'vhich may to a still greater extent be employed as ordinary trading vessels engaged in ordinary
trading. That fact of itself indicates the gro,ving importance of the particular question, if vessels so employed
are free from arrest.
The function of this court in this particular case is to
decide whether it is covered by The Parlement Belge. 7 I
think it is, and it is therefore not neccessary or desirable
that the court should enter upon a discussion of the
wider question at this stage, or consider the importance
of other views that may be taken. T·here is very little
difference between the material facts in The Parlement
Belge and in the present case, and in my opinion The
Parlement Belge is an authority \Vhich covers the
present case.
It is quite true that in many of the
earlier cases the claim put forward, 'vith regard to a
particular ship, 'vas that she was on public service and
employed in the public service, and no doubt the statement so made was applicable to the particular case, and
was made because it was applicable to the particular
case, and the judgments were ·delivered in reference to
the facts so stated. But in this case the court is bound
by the decision in The Parlement Belge and the appeal
must be dismissed 'vith costs.
V\TARRINGTON, L. J.: I am of the same opinion. I think
the case is clearly covered by the decision in The Parlement
Belge 11 , and, that being so, 've have no alternative but to
dismiss the appeal.
In the present case, the facts proYed appear to me to
amount to this: It is first proved that the ship in question
is a public vessel, the property of the Portuguese Government; next it is proved by the affidavits that it is in their
possession for the service of the State; and, thirdly, it is
proved that it is employed under the orders of the Government. There is one passage in the judgn1ent of Brett,
L. J., in The Parlement Belge in 'vhich he is expressing
'vhat he considers to be the result of the judgment in
Briggs Y. Light Boats 12 , an American case, of 'vhich he
obviously approves a~d on 'vhich he founds his o'vn conclusion. He says:" The ground of that judgrncnt is that
the public property of a Government in usc for public
purposes is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts of either
11

5 P. D. 197, 213, 217.

12

(1865) 93

;,r ass. 157.
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its O\Vn or any other state, and that ships of ..~ar are
beyond such jurisdiction, not because thay are ships of
\Var, but because they are public property. It puts all
the public movable property of a state, \vhich is in its
possession for public purposes, in the same category of
immunity from jurisdiction as the person of a sovereign,
or of an an1bassador, or of ships of 'var, and exempts it
from the jurisdiction of all courts for the same reason,
viz, that the exercise of such jurisdiction is inconsistent
\vith the independence of the· sovereign authority of the
state." And then again, when he is summing up the
principle \vhich he thinks is to be deduced from all the
cases, he says: "As a consequence of the absolute independence of every sovereign authority and of the international comity \vhich induces every sovereign state to
respect the independence of every other sovereign state,
each and every one declines to exercise, by 1neans of any
of its courts, any of its territorial jurisdiction over the
person of any sovereign or an1bassador of any other state,
or"-and these are the material vvords-'' over the public
property of any state \vhich is destined to its public use,
or over the property of any an1bassador, though such
sovereign, ambassador, or property be '>Yithin its territory,
and, therefore, but for the comn1on agreement, subject to
its jurisdiction."
Whatever may be the actual use to \Vhich this ship is
put, I think the evidence is quite sufficient to sho\v that it
is the property of the state, and is destined to public use;
and, that being so, the case seems to me to come exactly
vvithin the principle of the judgment in The Parle1nent
Belge 13 , yvith the result \vhich I indicated at the beginning
of my judgment.
ScRUTTON, L. J.: In this case the Porto Alexandre came
into the Mersey, got on to the mud, and "\Vas salved by
three Liverpool tugs. On arresting her to obtain security
for the payment of their salvage, the Portuguese Republic,
through the Portuguese charge d'affaires, put forward a
statement that she \Vas a public vessel of the Portuguese
Republic, and vvas therefore exen1pt from any process in
England. Accordingly the defendants moved to set
aside the writ and arrest. Hill, J., in the admiralty court
granted the application, and the plaintiffs' appeal to this
court.
13

5 P. D. 197.
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STATE IMMUNITY

N o,v, this State and other States proceed in their
jurisprudence on the assumption that sovereign States
are equal and independent, and that as a matter of international courtesy no one sovereign independent State
will exercise any jurisdiction over the person of the
sovereign or the property of any other sovereign State;
and now that sovereigns move about more freely than
they used to, and do things \vhich they used not to do,
and now that States do things which they used not to
do, the question arises "rhether there are any limits to
the immunity which international courtesy gives as between sovereign independent States and their sovereigns.
I think it has been well settled first of all as to the sovereign that there are no limits to the immunity which
he enjoys. His private character is equally free as his
public character. If he chooses to come into this country under an assumed name and indulge in privileges
not peculiar to sovereigns, of making promises of marriage and breaking them, the English courts still say on
his appearing in his true character of sovereign and
claiming his immunity, that he is absolutely free from
the jurisdiction of this court. That is the well-known
case of Mighell v. Sultan of Johore. u It has been held,
as Mr. Dunlop admits, in The Parlement Belge 15 that
trading on the part of a sovereign does not subject him
to any liability to the jurisdiction. His ambassador is
in the same position; an ambassador, coming here as an
ambassador of the sovereign may engage in private
trading, but it has been held that his immunity still
prptects him even from proceedings in respect of his
private trading. Jervis, C. J., in Taylor v. Best, 16
said: "* * * if the privilege does attach, it is not,
in the case of an ambassador or public minister, forfeited by the party's engaging in trade, as it \Vould,
by virtue of the proviso in the 7 Anne, chapter 12,
section 5, in the case of an an1bassador's servant . If
an ambassador or public minister, during his residence
in this country, violates the character in which he is
accredited to our court by engaging in commercial transactions that may raise a question bet\veen the government of this country and that of the count ry by \vhich
he is sent; but he does not thereby lose the general
H

[1894]1 Q. B . 149.
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u 5 P. D. 197.
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(18.5 1) 14 C. D. 487, 519.
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privilege which the law of nations has conferred upon
persons filling that high character, the proviso in the
statute of Anne limiting the privilege in cases of trading
applying only to the servants of the embassy." There
being no limitation in the case of the sovereign, and no
limitation in the case of the ambassador, is there any
limitation in the case of the property~ Mr. Dunlop has
argued before us that in the case of property of the
State there is a limitation, and that-as I understand
him-if the property is used in trading, that can not be
for the public service of the State. That is not the way
in which he expressed it, but it appears to me to be the
proposition which emerges from his argument.
We are concluded in this court by the decision in The
Parlement Belge. 11 Sir Robert Phillimore took the view
that trading with the property of a state might render
that property liable to seizure; but the court of appeal in
The Parlement Belge overruled the views of Sir Robert
Phillimore, as I understand them. The principle then
laid down has been recited by the other members of the
court. Brett, L. J., said: "As a consequence of the absolute independence of every sovereign authority and of the
international comity which induces every sovereign state
to respect the independence of every other sovereign state,
each and every one declines to exercise by means of any
of its courts, any of its territorial jurisdiction over the
person of any sovereign or ambassador of any other state,
or over the public property of any state which is destined
to its public use." One of the reasons given seems to me
conclusive: the moment property is arrested in the
admiralty court a proceeding is instituted against the
person, and the person is compelled to appear if he wants
to protect his property, and by seizing his property the
personal rights of the sovereign or the personal rights of
the state are interfered with. The position seems to me
to be very accurately stated in the seventh edition of
Hall's Inter:Q.ational Law, at page 211, where, after dealing
with warships and public vessels so called, Mr. Hall goes
on to deal with other vessels employed in the public
service and property possessed by the state 'vithin foreign
jurisdiction, and says: "If in a question with respect to
property coming before the courts a foreign state shows
the property to be its o'vn, and claims delivery, juris17

5 P. D. 197, 217.

THE TERVAETE

diction at once fails, except in so far as it may be needed
for the protection of the foreign state."
I quite appreciate the difficulty and doubt which
Hill, J., felt in this case, because no one can shut his eyes,
now that the fashion of nationali.?.ation is in the air, to
the fact that many states are trading, or are about t<;>
trade, with ships belonging to themselves; and if these
national shi\ps wander about without liabilities, many
trading affairs will become difficult; but it seems to me
the remedy is not in these courts. The Parlement Belge
excludes remedies in these courts. But there are practical commercial remedies. If ships of the State find
themselves left on the mud because no one will salve them
when the State refuses any legal remedy for salvage,
their owners will be apt to change their views. If the
owners of cargoes on national ships find that the ship
runs away and leaves them to bear all the expenses of
salvage, as has been done in this case, there may be
found a difficulty in getting cargoes for national ships.
These are matters to be dealt with by negotiations
between governments, and not by governments exercising their power to interfere with the property of other
States contrary to the principles of international courtesy
which govern the relations between independent and
sovereign States. While appreciating the difficulties
which Hill, J., has felt, I think it is clear that we 1nust,
in this court, stand by the decision already given, and the
appeal must be dismissed.

THE "TERV AETE"
[1922] p. 259]

Shipping-Collision-Foreign state-owned vessel- }.Ifaritime lienVessel sold into private ownership-Jurisdiction-Immunity from
arrest
Damage occasioned by collision with a foreign state-owned vessel
does not impose a maritime lien upon the vessel, and if the
vessel be subsequently sold into private ownership she is
not then liable to arrest in an action in rem.
Decision of. Duke, P., reversed.

Appeal from a decision of Sir I-Ienry Duke, P., sitting
in admiralty, dismissing a motion to sot aside a 'vrit in
an action in rem.
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The appellants, defendants in the action, were the
o'vners of the steamship Tervaete_,· the respondents 'vere
the owners of the steamship Lynntown.
The action was brought to recover damages in respect
of a collision which took place bet\veen the Lynntown, a
J3ritish vessel, and the Tervaete on May 18, 1920, in the
port of Bonanza, on the Guadalquivir River. At that
time the Tervaete belonged to the Government of the
l{ing of the Belgians and was being run as a coal ship
for public purposes. After the collision she was sold by
the Belgian Government into private O\Vnership, and at
the time of the commencement of the present proceedings
she was the property of the Societe Anonyme Belge
d' Armement et de Gerance. The plaintiffs issued and
served their writ on January 10, 1922, the Tervaete being
then in Barry Dock; but they refrained from arresting
her in consideration of an undertaking by the solicitors
for the defendants to enter an appearance and put in
bail. Appe_arance was entered under protest, and a
motion was then set down by the defendants to discharge
the solicitors' undertaking and to set aside the writ.
Duke, P., held that a foreign state by its authorized
agents could impose a lien upon one of its public ships,
and that the lien might be enforced if it could be done
without directly or indirectly impleading the foreign
state. He was of opinion that the maritime lien in the
present case \Vas capable of being enforced \vithout any
assertion of jurisdiction over the Belgian State or its
property, and accordingly dismissed the motion. The
defendants appealed.
Argument for
Bateson, K. C., and E. Aylmer Digby for the appellants:
the appellants.
The court had no jurisdiction to entertain the action.
As a state-owned vessel is immune from arrest, no maritime lien can attach to her, and if it never attached it
can not revive \Vhen the vessel is sold into private ownership. A maritime lien does not attach in every case of
collision-e. g., collisions caused through the barratrous
acts of the master or, before the pilotage act, 1913, by
the negligence of a compulsory pilot, do not give a right
of action against the o\vners: See also The Tas1nania 17
as to the position of vessels under charter.
[ScRUTTON, L. J. This collision took place in a Spanish
port; before the admiralty court act of I861 the court
-vvould not have entertained such an action: The Ida.18 ]
17

(1888) 13 P. D. 110.

.

1s (1860) Lush. 6.

MARITIME LIEN

No. It has, however, been held that Alexandria and
Algiers are "on the high seas," because they are not
within the body of a country: The Mecca. 19
A maritime lien is not a lien at all; it is a claim to
priority involving an action in rem and therefore implea.ds
the oYrner of the res. It was defined in The Bold BtlCclengh 20 as "a claim or privilege to be carried into effect
by legal process;" and in 01trrie v. },fcl{night 21 Lord
Watson described it as a remedy against the corpus
of the offending ship; see also The Dictator 22 and The
Ripon Oity, 23 where the nature of a maritime lien 'vas
fully discussed. The collision with the Lynrdo,wn gave her
owners no claim against the then owners of the Tervaete
which could be earried into effect by legal process; and
Brett, L. J., said in The Parlement Belge 24 that "the
property can not be sold as against the new owner, if
it could not have been sold as against the owner at the
time." Similarly in The Oastlegate 25 Lord Watson said
that the general principle of maritime la"\V was that
"jnasmuch as every proceeding in rem is in substance
a proceeding against the owner of the ship, a proper
maritime lien must have its root in his personal liability;"
and Sir Francis J eune in The Utopia 26 made· similar
observations. The president, therefore, wa.s wrong in
holding that there 'vas a maritime lien capable of being
given effect to without impleading the foreign· state.
A dormant maritime lien attaching to a state-o,vned
vessel necessarily diminishes the value of the state's
property. A maritime lien is, in the "\vords of Barnes, J.,
in The R,ipon Oity,Z 3 a jus in re aliena, and to allo'v such
a lien to attach at all would be a subtraction from the
absolute property of the o'vner. The cases in "\vhich
there have been cross claims against a foreign sov ereign
or sovereign states-e. g., The lvewbattle 27-stand in a
different category; for if a foreign sovereign sues in a
British court he submits himself to th e jurisdiction of
the court, and the court naturally "\vill see that justice
is done. If, therefore, there is a counter-claim or cross
action the court, if necessary, 'vill order the foreign
[1895] p. 95.
(1851) 7 Moo. P. C . 267, 284.
21 [1897] A. C. 97, lOG.
22 [1892] P. 304.
23 [1897] P. 226.

(1880) 5 P . D. 197, 218.
A. C. 38, 52.
[1893] A. C. 492.
(1885) 10 P. D . 33.
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sovereign t.o give security: The }lewbattle 21 . While
there is no English authority on the question at issue,
it arose recently in the United States, and the Supreme
Court decided by a 1najority that no maritime lien
attached in the case of collision with a Governmentowned vessel: []nited States of America, Owners of the
Western Maid v. Atlxiliary Schooner Liberty and Stearnship Carolinian. 28
[R.eference was also made to The Aline 29 and, on the
position of requisitioned vessels, The Broadmayne. 30 ]
Argument tor
C. R. Dunlop, K. C. and Dumas for the respondents:
the respondents.
.
.
l
.
There are two questions Invo ved. l-Ias the admiralty
court jurisdiction to entertain the action at all; and if it
has, is there any ground why it should refuse to do so~
As regards the locus, there can be no question that the
ad1niralty court act, 1861, gives the court jurisdiction
over cases of collision in foreign inland waters, \Vhether
the vessels concerned are British, The Diana; 31 or
foreign, The Courier. 32 The argument of the appellants
confuses the position of the British Crown, which can
do no \vrong, cf. Tobin v. The Queen/' 3 with the position
of a foreign sovereign, in favor of whom there is no such
axiom. A foreign sovereign is not incapable of committing a tort. In Mighell v. Sultan of J ohore 34 it was not
suggested that the Sultan could not create against himself
a good cause of action, nor in South African Republic v.
La Compagnie Franco-Belge du Chemin de Fer du Nord 35
that the Republic could not commit a libel. Also, a
foreign sovereign who is plaintiff is liable to have a counterclaim or cross-action brought. against him: The Newbattle.21
[BANKES, I..~. J. In The Newbattle 27 the court said it
could not order the vessel to be seized.]
No, but the foreign sovereign was compelled to give
security to answer the cross action: see also Strousberg
v. Republic of Costa Rica. 36 In Magdalena Steam Navigation Co. v. 1llartin/1in \vhich the position of ari ambassador was considered, the case appears to have proceeded
on the footing that the remedy was in suspension.
[Scrutton, L. J., referred to J,fusurus Bey v. Gadban. :-H~l
27
2S
2g
30

31
11

(1885) 10 P. D. 33.
[257 u.S. 419].
(1839) 1 \V. Rob. 111.
[1916] p. 54.
(1862) Lush. 5~.i9.
(1~132) Lush. MI.

(1864) 33 L. J. (C. P.) 199.
(1894) 1 Q. B. 149.
35 (1897) 2 Cb. 487.
36 (1880) 44 L. T.199.
37 (1859) 2 E. & E. 94.
3S (1894) 2 Q. B. 352.
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JURISDICTION

On the second point, namely, whether the Court ought
to exercise jurisdiction, it 'vill do so unless a claim of
sovereignty is asserted, and the claim must be asserted
by the foreign sovereign or some one on his behalf. It
is not suggested by the secretary to the Belgian ambassador that the Belgian Government objects to the action
against the Tervaete; the affidavit in support of the motion to set aside the writ is made by the Belgian vice
consul at Cardiff acting on behalf of the appellants, a
commercial firm. The president was right in his conclusion that the maritime lien could be enforced without
impleading the foreign government. The date when the
action is brought and not the date of the contract or tort
is the material date: Munden v. Dulce of Brunswick. 39
The rule in The Parlement Belge 40 is not infringed by the
present action; and the dictum of Brett, L. J., in that
case, relied on by the appellants, is obiter, and further
had reference to a different state of facts-the lord justice
'vas discussing whether a lien could attach to a ship in
the hands of a subsequent owner when there was no negligence on the servants of the owners at the time of the
collision.
[Reference was also made to The Ticonderoga 41 and
The Porto Alexandre. 42l
Digby in reply: The fallacy in the respondents'
case is their contention that there is a distinction between the case of an action against the British Crown
and an action against a foreign sovereign or state, and
that in the latter case the court merely declines to
exercise jurisdiction, while in the former it is admitted
that the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the action
at all. Both cases stand on the same footing. There
is no jurisdiction in either case: See The Oonstitution, 43
where the defendants being a foreign state it was held
that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the
action: See also the report of The Parlement Belge in
the admiralty court/4 where the attorney general's
protest is set out, from which it appears that the point
taken was absence of jurisdiction.
ag
40
41

(1847) 4 C. B. 321; 10 Ad. & E. 656.
5 P. D. 197, 218.
(1857) Swa. 215.

12
43
H

[1920] P. 30.
(1879) 4 P. D . 39 .
4 P. D. 129, 131.
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of

July 12. The following judgments were read:
BANKES, L. J.: The material facts lie in a small
compass. In May, 1920, a collision occurred between
the respondents' vessel, the Lynntown, and the Tervaete,
which at that time was the property of the Belgian
Government and employed on Government service.
Subsequently to the collision the Belgian Government
transferred the Tervaete to a private owner, and after
she had been so transferred she came in to Barry Dock.
The respondents contend that as a result of the collision
a maritime lien attached to the Tervaete, which, now
that she is private property and is found within· the
jurisdiction, they are entitled to enforce by proceedings
in rem in the admiralty court of this country. The
present proceedings were taken by the respon~ents
to test the correctness of that contention. The respondents do not contest the proposition that as a
general principle of maritime law, in the case of a claim
for damage arising out of collision, a proper maritime
lien must have its root in the personal liability of the
owner, or of the person for this purpose in the position
of owner. The subject is very fully discussed by Gorell
Barnes, J., in The Ripon Oity, 45 in which he gives a definition of maritime lien in language which is, I think, of
assistance in this case. He says: "Such a lien is a
privileged claim upon a vessel in respect . of service
done to it, or injury caused by it, to be carried into
effect by legal process. It is a right acquired by one
over a thing belonging to another-a jus in re aliena.
It is, so to speak, a subtraction from the absolute_property
of the owner in the thing. This right must, therefore,
in some way have been derived fron1 the owner either
directly or through the acts of persons deriving their
authority from the owner." The respondents further
do not dispute that, so long as the Tervaete remained
the property of the Belgian Government, no proceedings
could be taken either in personam or in rem in respect
of the damage done to their vessel by the collision.
The contention upon which the respondents relied in
the court below, and which \Vas accepted by the presi..;
dent~ was that the fact that no such proceedings could
be taken was not due to an absence of any liability on the
part of the Belgian Government for the negligence of
~5
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their servants which brought about the collision, but to
the rule introduced by international comity which prohibited the taking of any proceedings to enforce that
liability. As a further contention founded upon the one
just mentioned, it was said that a maritime lien did attach to the Tervaete as a consequence of the collision,
and though it remained, as it were, dormant and unenforceable during the ownership of the vessel by the Belgian Government, it became enforceable when the vessel
passed into private ownership. These contentions raise
the question whether a maritime lien ever did attach to
the vessel at a time when· she was owned by the Belgian
Government. This is quite a different case from a case
where a maritime lien attached to a vessel at a time when
she was privately owned, and which vessel afterwards
passed into government ownership, and then into private ownership again. It, may well be that in such a
case the maritime lien is dormant during the period of
government ownership. The present case is quite distinct from that, and involves the question whether a
maritime lien ever attached to the Tervaete at all.
I think it may be conceded for the purposes of the argu~ mgn
_Liability ~rrorsovereign.
ment that the fact .that a sovereign or a sovereign powe1
can not be proceeded against in the courts of a foreign
country does not exclude all idea of liability for a breach
of contract, or for a tort, in the sense that under no circumstances can the sovereign or the sovereign state do
wrong. The rule that where a foreign sovereign sues in
the courts of this country, proceedings may be taken
against him in mitigation of the relief claimed by him,
would be of no value except upon the assumption that
claims for breaches of contract, or for torts, might be
established and set off in mitigation. In Imperial J apanese Government v. P. & 0. Oo.,4 6 the whole discussion
as to the court in which proceedings might be taken
would have been avoided had the law been that the Emperor of Japan could not be liable for damages resulting
from the collision of his vessel \vith that of the defendants.
The point was, however, not suggested in that case. In
The Newbattle 41 it was assumed that the I{ing of the
Belgians might be held liable in damages in the cross
cause for the negligence of those in charge of his vessel,
the Louise Marie. .The fact that the immunity of an
46
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ambassador from process in the courts of this country
in respect of debts contracted while he was ambassador
lasts during the time during which he is accredited to the
sovereign and for such a reasonable period after he has
presented his letters of recall to enable him to 'vind up
his official business and to prepare for his return home,
which is the law as laid down in ),_fusurus Bey v. Gadban, 48 points also in n1y opinion to the same conclusion.
In the numerous cases such as South 4frican Republic
v. La Compagnie Franco-Belge du Chemin de Fer du
Nord, 49 in which t the question arose of enforcing cross
claims in actions by sovereigns or sovereign states, it
appears to me to be assumed that the cross claims are in
respect of breaches of conduct or of tort actually committed, and for which the sovereign or the sovereign
state 'vould have been responsible but for the immunity
from process which he or they enjoyed.
In spite of the fact that so far I have accepted the
arguments of the respondents in support of the judgment
of the President, I am unable to agree with his final conclusion, and I do so upon a point to which his attention
does not appear to have been specially directed. The
point is founded partly upon the effect upon the property
of the sovereign state if a maritime lien attached to the
Tervaete as alleged, and partly upon a consideration of
the nature of a maritime lien itself. If the judgment of
the president is right, and the maritime lien attached to
the Tervaete, the value of the vessel to the Belgium
Government must necessarily have been affected; how
seriously of course depends upon the amount of the
respondents' claim. A vessel to which a maritime lien
extends for any substantial amount must necessarily be
worth less in the market than if she was free from any
lien. In The Bold Buccleugh 50 Sir John Jervis, 'vhen
dealing with the question of a maritime lien, adopts
Lord 'renterden 's definition of it, as a claim or privilege
to be carried into effect by legal process; and he then
goes on to say that a maritime lien is the foundation of
the proceedings in rem, a process to make perfect a right
inchoate from the moment the lien attaches. In Currie
v. J,fcl(night 51 Lord Watson speaks of a maritime lien
i:V3 a remedy against the corpus of the offending ship.
48
4g
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vVhether a maritime lien is properly to be regarded as a
step in the process of enforcing a claim against the 0\Vners
of a ship, or as a remedy or partial remedy in itself, or as
a n1eans of securing a priority of claim, it can not, in my
opinion, consistently \Vith the rule of immunity laid
down by the lavv of nations, be attached to a vessel
belonging to a sovereign po\ver and being used for public
purposes. To allow such a lien to attach would be to use
Gorell Barnes, J. 's, language in The Ripon Oity, 52 to
create a jus in re aliena, a subtraction from the absolute
property of the sovereign state.
I may here refer to Jfusu.rus Bey v. Gadban 53 , in which
the immunity from process of an ambassador was considered. It was argued in that case that it was permissible. to issue a writ against an ambassador in order to
prevent the running of the statute of limitation, provided no further step of ~erving or attempting to serve
\Vas taken. The court, taking the same view as was
taken in Magdalena Steam Navigation Go. v. Martin, 54
refused to accept the contention. Davey, L. J., said:
"With regard to the first" (that is the contention I
have just referred to) "it is in my opinion sufficient to
refer to the third section of 7 Anne, chapter 12, which
makes all writs and processes, \Vhereby the person of
any ambassador or other public minister may be arrested
or imprisoned, or his goods and chattels may be distrained, seized, or attached, utterly null and void. It
has been decided in Magdalena Steam Navigation Go. v.
Martin 54 that this section applies not only to writs of
execution against the property or person of a privileged
person, but also to writs which lead up to and would
in ordinary course have the consequence of attaching
his goods or person. If so, I am of opinion that a \Vrit
of summons in an action is of that character, and that
the effect of the statute (which is said to be declaratory
only of the common la,v) is to make such a \vTit void
and of no effect. Mr. Pollard is quite right in saying
that the writ had been served in the J.llagdalena case,
and that all that it was necessary to decide \Vas that that
service was bad. But the grounds upon \Vhich the
decision \Vas based in I.1ord Campbell's juclgn1ent go
beyond that point, and in my opinion sho\V a total \Vant
of jurisdiction of the court to entertain the action at all.
52
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Lord Campbell, at page 111, states the principle to be
that for all juridical purposes an ambassador is supposed
still to be in his own country, and he concluded his
judgment in these words: 'It certainly has not hitherto
been expressly decided that a public minister duly accredited to the Queen by a foreign state is privileged
from all liability to be sued here in civil actions; but we
think that this follows from well-established principles.'
These pass~ges, in my opinion, correctly state the legal
principles on which the exemption is founded, and are in
accordance with the course of decisions in our courts:
See, for example, the latest case of The Parlement Belge
in the court of appeal, in which it was said (I am reading
from the marginal note, which is fully borne out by the
judgment) that as a consequence of the absolute independence of every sovereign authority and of the international comity which induces every sovereign state to
respect the independence of every other sovereign state,
each state declines to exercise by n1eans of any of its
courts any of its territorial jurisdiction over the person
of any sovereign or ambassador, or over the public
property of any state which is destined to its public use,
or over the property of any ambassador, though such
sovereign, ambassador, or property be within its territory. I am unable to think that the issue of a "\Vrit
in an action which action the court has no jurisdiction
to entertain, and which writ, therefore, the court has no
jurisdiction to issue, can prevent the statute running."
It seems to me impossible consistently "\Vith the la'v as
there expressed to hold that it is permissible to recognize
a maritime lien as attaching to the property of a sovereign
or a sovereign state. I see no distinction in principle
bet,veen the act of the individual issuing the 'vrit and
the act of the law attaching the lien. Each equally
offends the rule affording immunity. If this is the correct vie'v of the law then the appellants are entitled to
succeed, because unless a maritime lien attached to the
Terraete while she \Vas the property of the Belgian Government it can not attach at all. In my opinion the
appeal must be allo,ved with costs here and belo'v and
the order made 'vith costs relieving Messrs. Do,vning
and Handcock of their undertaking dated January 12,
1922, and setting the writ aside and staying all proceedings theround e.r.

PROCEDURE IN REM

L. J.: In May, 1920, the English steamer,
Lynntown, being in the Spanish port of Bonanza on the
Guadalquivir River and within Spanish territorial waters,
but on the "high seas," as that term is interpreted in the
English admiralty court, sustained damage by collision
with the steamship Tervaete. The Tervaete had been surrendered by the German Government to the allied powers,
who handed her over to the Belgian Government, whose
property she was at the time of the collision. After the
collision the Belgian Government sold the Tervaete to
private owners, under whose ownership she came to Barry
Dock \vhere she \vas arrested by a procedure in rem at the
suit of. the owners of the Lynntown. They alleged that
the collision gave rise to a maritime lien, inchoate till the.
Tervaete came within British territorial \Vaters, dormant
till she ceased to be the property of the Belgian Government, but which could be enforced \vhen the Tervaete, as
the property of private~ o\vners, came within British
jurisdiction.
The owners of the Tervaete replied that as the Tervaete
at the time of the collision was the property of the Belgian
Government, against whom no proceedings could be taken
in personam and against whose ship no proceedings could
be taken in rem, no maritime lien could arise. The
president, in a reserved judgment, adopted the contention
of the owners of the Lynntown, and the O\vners of the
Tervaete appeal.
In my view it is no\v established that procedure in rem
is not based upon wrongdoing of the ship personified as an
offender, but is a means of bringing the o\vner of the ship
to meet his personal liability by seizing his property.
The so-called maritime lien has nothing to do \vith possession, but is a priority in claim over the proceeds of
sale of the ship in preference to other claimants. It does
not appear eo nomine in cases of collision in the reports
till The Bold Buccleugh 55 \vas heard in 1851, where it is
defined as a claim or privilege upon a thing to be carried
intq effect by legal process; and it is stated, erroneously
as is now admitted, that wherever an action in re1n lies
there a maritime lien exists. The report proceeds:
"This claim or privilege travels \vith the thing, into
\vhosesoever possession it may come. It is inchoate from
the moment the claim or privilege attaches, and \vhen
ScRUTTON,

65

7 1\t[oo. P. C. 267, 284.

69

70

VESSELS : OWNERSHIP, CHARTER, AND SERVIOE

carried into effect by legal process, by a proceeding in
rem, relates back to the period when it first attached."
The cases as to the relation of a maritime lien to the
personal liability of tbe owner are exhaustively examined
by the late Lord Gorell in The Ripon City. 56 He comes
to the conclusion that a maritime lien may exist, though
the owner is not personally liable, where there is personal
liability in those to whom he has voluntarily intrusted the
control of the vessel, as charterers, though not if his
intrusting is compulsory, as in th.e case of compulsory
pilots. But for a lien to arise, in my view, some person
having by permission of the owner temporary ownership
or possession of the vessel must be liable for the collision.
If he is so liable, a privilege or lien at once arises in this
sense, that if the vessel comes within English territorial
waters it may be arrested, and the claim or privilege on it
will date back to the time of the lien. Any purchaser
after the collision takes the ship subject to this possibility
·
of claim.
At the time of the collision, if it happ.ened in English
waters, would it have been possible to arrest the Tervaete
and claim a maritime lien? The well-known decision of
The Parlement Belge compels the answer in the negative.
Neither the Belgian Government could have been sued
in personam, nor could their ship have been arrested
in rem. If this is so, I do not understand how there could
then be any maritime lien on the ship. To hold that a
lien would come into existence, if the Government sold
the ship to a private purchaser, would be to deprive
the Belgian Government of part of their property, for
such a lien about to arise must reduce the price paid to
the Government and so affect the property of the Government.
The general language of Lord Watson in The Castlegate, 57 that "a proper maritime lien must have its root
in the personal liability of the owner," approving the
language of Lord Esher to the same effect in The Parlement Belge, and the similar langu~ge of Sir Francis
Jeune in The Utopia, 58 appear to me entirely to support
this vie,v, even if that general language is not applicable,
as Gorell Barnes, J., in The Ripon City 59 thought it \Vas
p. 226.
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66 [1897]

58

67

f9

[1893] A. C. 492, 499.
[1897] p. 226.

GOVERNMENTAL EXEMPTION

not, to the complicated facts in that case. And while I
agree \vith the president that the passage in The Parlement Belge 60 was not strictly necessary to Brett, L. J.'s,
decision, yet it was so closely related to it that coming
from such a master of maritime law I have no hesitation
in following it, especially as I agree \Vith it in principle.
Brett, L. J., says: "The property can not be sold as
against the new owner, if it could not have been sold as
against the owner at the time when the alleged lien
accrued. This doctrine of the courts of admiralty goes
only to this extent, that the innocent purchaser takes the
property subject to the inchoate maritime lien which
attached to it as against hin1 who was the owner at the
time the lien attached." In the present case no lien
attached against the Belgium Government, nor could
their ship have been arrested in rem. But if they could
only sell the ship subject to the lien, their property
would be affected by the lien, in that they would receive
less than the value of the ship free from encumbrances
or liens. The result would be that our law would assert
a right over the property of a foreign sovereign not
arising from any voluntary action on his pa~t, which
adversely affected his property.
I agree that a sovereign may call upon us to enforce
legal rights in his favor. The Newbattle 47 sho\vs that
if he does so, we may refuse to enforce those rights
unless he allows the legal rights \Ve recognize to be
effectively enforced against him. I agree that cases
like Gladstone v. Musurus Bey 60 and Larivere v. Morgan 61 show that where English trusts are concerned, this
court will proceed though foreign sovereigns' rights are
concerned, while, on the other hand, Vavasse,u r v.
Krupp 62 involves the proposition that this country will
not enforce English patent rights against property in the
jurisdiction 'vhich a foreign sovereign claims. I am
disposed to agree that the ground of the decisions is tha.t ,
though there are English rights, we do not enforce them
against a foreign sovereign directly or indirectly because of the comity of nations. But it respectfully
appears to me that the error of the president's judgment
is that he is enforcing rights against a foreign sovereign
indirectly, when he supports t he vie\v that over his
4710P.D.'33.
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property there is by English la'v an inchoate lien which
will diminish the value of that property by lowering
the price that a private purchaser will give for it.
I appreciate that the matter becomes of international
importance, if States increase their commercial trading
by national fleets. I have already in The Porto Alexandre 12 expressed my views on the disadvantage of State
immunity in such circumstances. But the remedy is, in
my opinion, State agreements by diplomatic action, not
infringement of legal principles based on the comity of
nations.
For these reasons I think the appeal must be allowed
with costs here and below, and the writ against the
Tervaete set aside.
ATKI~, L. J.: This case raises a question of considerable importance. I have found it difficult, and I differ
from the reasoning of the learned president 'vith hesitation; but having formed a judgment which is not in
agreement with his conclusion I must express it.
I understand the argument made by the respondents
and enfqrced by the president to be this. Collision
damage caused by the negligent navigation of a ship
creates a right in the person injured to recover damages
from the owner responsible for the navigation. It also
creates a right in the person injured to a maritime lien
over the ship, so causiri.g damage. That lien is not a
possessory lien; but consists of the right by legal proceedings in an appropriate form to have the ship seized
by officers of the court and made available by sale if not
released on bail to pay the collision damage. If the ship
is the property of a foreign sovereign it is admitted that
legal proceedings can not be commenced against him
either personally or in rem-i.e., for the arrest of the
ship-because by comity of nations no process can be
brought in the courts against the person or the property
of a foreign sovereign. But this is only a personal
privilege of the sovereign not to be impleaded. The
right of the injured person to damages and to a lien still
exists; and as the right to a lien is not abrogated when
the ship is transferred into the property of a third person,
so when the ship formerly o'vned by the foreign sovereign
becomes the property of a third person not protected by
the personal privilege of the sovereign, the right to a lien
becomes effective, and the necessary proceedings in rem
42
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may be taken against the ship. The right to a maritime
lien, it is said,. is equivalent to a charge created by the
voluntary hypothecation of a chattel by the sovereign,
a charge "rhich may not be capable of enforcement while
the chattel is in the possession or o'vnership of the
sovereign, but can be enforced as soon as it is transferred
to the property of a third person.
A part of this reasoning is irresistible. It seems to me
correct to say that the acts of a foreign sovereign may
constitute breaches of contract or of duty not arising
from contract which create rights in the other party.
True, such rights may be of little value, as they can not
ordinarily be enforced by action. But the inability is a
mere personal inability to sue; they can be made effective
in defense as, for instance, by set-off 'vhere the rights
give rise to a power of set-off; and, as I should suppose,
by a plea of contributory negligence; and should the
sovereign submit to the jurisdiction in respect of a claim
based upon such rights, I apprehend that the court
would be bound to give effect to them.
But in my judgment upon a true analysis of vvhat is
meant by a maritime lien the right to such a lien is not
such as can be created at all by the act of a sovereign.
It is not a right to take possession or to hold possession
of the ship. It is confined to a right to take proceedings
in a court of law to have the ship seized, and, if necessary,
sold. The action in rem is an action in which the o'vners·
of the ship are named as parties to the proceedings and
in which, according to our procedure, if they appear, subject to the statutory right to limit liability, they 'viii be
made liable personally for the full damage regardless of
the value of the res. The ovvner, therefore, in such an
action is directly impleaded. But whether it be directly
or indirectly, the o'vner who is a foreign sovereign can
not be impleted at all. The result appears to me to be
that the maritime lien against a foreign sovereign can
not exist at all. A right which can only be expressed as
a right to take proceedings seems to me to be denied
'vhere the right to take proceedings is denied. No independent liability of the sovereign such as a liability for
debt or damages remains pendent protected only by an
immunity from legal proceedings. The right of maritime lien appears, therefore, to be essentially different
from a right of property hypothec or pledge created by the
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voluntary act of the sovereign. If this reasoning be
correct, inasmuch as there never 'vas a time during the
ownership of the Belgian Government when the respondents could aver that they possessed a maritime lien
over the Tervaete, there was no obligation 'vhich attached
to the ship or to the new owners when the ship became
their property. On the explanation of the origin of a
maritime lien given by Jeune, P., in The Dictator, 63 one
may perhaps be allowed to 'vonder how such a right
avo,vedly dependent upon the personal liability of the
o'vner could be held to be enforceable against a ne'v
owner not in any 'vay personally liable for the collision.
It is too late to raise a doubt as to this point after the
decision of The Bold Buccleugh. 64 But 'vhere there 'vas
no right against the old owner, the new owner must
escape. I myself should in any case feel bound by the
dictum of Lord Esher in The Parlement Belge, 7 referred
to in the judgment of the president.
I have thought it necessary to state my vie,vs on this
difficult question in my own way, because I am not sure
that I feel so much pressed as my brothers "-rith the contention that a dormant maritime lien over a foreign sovereign's ship 'vould affect the value of the ship in his hands,
and therefore must be negatived. The supposition that
the liability existed as for personal claims, but was merely
~nenforceable, does not seem necessarily to be invalidated
by the fact that such liability would impose pecuniary
disadvantages upon the sovereign. A voluntary pledge
or hypothec would be attended with the same results,
but would it not be valid~ I do not, however, dissent
from their view. I concur in the views taken by my
brothers of the cases cited by them and of their bearing
on this case. I only desire to add a 'vord or t'vo on The
Newbattle 41 in the court of appeal. There the court held
that upon the construction of the admiralty court act,
1861, where a foreign Government had brought an action
in rem against the o'vners of the Ne1.vbattle, an order could
be n1ade staying the action until security had been given
by the plaintiffs to ans,ver the cross claim of the defendant
in respect of the same collision. The relevance of the
case is that under the section a condition precedent of
such an order is that the plaintiffs' ship can not be
7 5 P. D. 197.
4110 P. D. 33.
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arrested, and the decision of·the court proceeds upon the
ground that though the foreign sovereign had invoked
the jurisdiction of the court and though he was under
possible liability for damages in an effective cross suit,
yet his ship vvas exempt from arrest. That a maritime
lien was not enforceable under such circumstances
appears to afford strong support for the vievv that it did
not exist at all.
For these reasons I think the appeal must be allovvcd
and the order made as stated by Bankes, L. J.
Appeal allowed.
THE "ISLAND "
January 30, 1918
(2 Entscheidungen des Obcrprisengerichts in Berlin, 8)

In the prize matter concerning the Danish steamer
Island, home port Copenhagen, the imperial superior
prize court in Berlin in its session of January 30, 1918,
decreed:
The appeal against the judgment of the prize court in
Kiel of May 30, 1917, is dismissed. The costs of the
appeal are to be borne by the claimant. The further
complaint of the owners against the decision of December 12, 1919, of the prize court in Kiel is hereby disposed
of.
Reasons:
The Danish steamer Island, on the way from Copen- statement
hagen to New Castle in ballast, was brought to by a the facts.
German war vessel on December 2, 1916, and, for
purposes of a more thorough search, \Vas taken in to
S\vinemunde, where seizure in prize followed on Decemher 12, 1916.
The vessel, built in Glasgow in the year 1894, can1e into
Danish possession in the year 1900, and, after frequent
changes of ovvnership and name in Denmark, \vas sold
by an agreement of November 24, 1915-July 21, 1916,
by the then owner, the Steamer Island Corporation, in
Copenhagen, to the claimant, Atlantic Ocean Stca.1nship
Co., a corporation in Copenhagen. The vessel, \vhich
formerly was called Esrom, was rechristened Island by
the predecessor of the plaintiff. The Island Co. bought
the ship in December, 1914, for 275,000 cro\vns; the
claimant bought it for 1,000,000 cro\vns. According to
an appraisal made at the instigation of the claimant by
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three experts named by the admiralty and commercial
court in Copenhagen, pres en ted to the court of first
instance, the ship is supposed to be no\V worth 3,120,000
crowns.
E~g~irht.ure by
In October, 1915, the ship, at that time still under the
name of Esrom, while on a voyage from America to
Sweden, was captured by the English and ordered to
Hull. The English thought there was ground for the
assumption that the vessel '\Vas in whole or in part German property.
Thereupon the English Admiralty, after the ship had
lain idle a \vhile, requisitioned her, despite the protest of
the owners and of the Danish Government, and sailed
her under the English flag from January to July, 1916.
le~~~ditional re· In August, 1916, the release of the vessel was accom'plished on the condition that she be chartered to an
English firm, and on August 16, 1916, having in the
meantime been taken over by the present claimant,
she set sail for Copenhagen from London, where she had
lain. Here she was to be docked and undergo_ extensive
repairs, for which there had been no opportuinity in
Chart.ertoEng-England. By an agreement of August 23, 1916, the ship
lish firm.
was chartered by the clain1an t to the firm of Furness,
Withy & Co., Liverpool, as of September 30 at the latest.
• It is provided in the charter party that under certain
conditions the time of delivery to the charterer may be
extended still further. On December 2, 1916, after
partial repairs, the vessel set out in ballast for England,
and on this trip was stopped .by a German \Var vessel.
These facts, in part cleared up for the first time in the
court of second instance, are incontestable in vie\v of
the records.
Claim \vas raised by the Atlantic Ocean Steamship
Co. in Copenhagen for the release of the steamer, or compensation to the extent of 3,120,000 crowns. The claim
was based on the ground that the ship as neutral \vas not
subject to capture; more especially that the fact that for
six months she had sailed under the English flag under
compulsion had not brought about a change of flag.
DecisionofKiel
By decision of the prize court at Kiel on May 30, 1917,
prize court.
the claim was rejected, and confiscation of the vessel
decreed. The prize court stands upon the ground that
in truth the illegal requisitioning on the part of the English Admiralty, and the ensuing use under the English
flag, did not change the nationality of the ship. It as-
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sumed, however, that the charter of the ship to the firn1
of Furness, Withy & Co. was already running at the time
of the arrest, and that this contract of charter was tan~a
mount to a charter to the English Government, inasmuch
as it was known to the prize court, through secret information to the German Admiralty staff from a reliable
source, that that English firm was an agent of the English Government. It was therefore to be presumed, until
the contrary was proved, that a chartering to the English
Government- had been consummated.
This would be conclusive in the terms of article 55 c of
the Prize Code.
.
Against this decision the claimants have appealed · terTerms
or
char·
party.
They deny that at the time of capture the ship was under
charter to the English. According to the charter party,
which was produced, the charter was rather to begin on
the day of the· delivery of the ship to the charterer in
condition to carry cargo. This, however, had not yet
ensued at the time of the arrest. Furthermore, the judge
of first instance errs concerning the burden of proof, in
laying upon the claimant the proof that the chartering to
Furness, Withy & Co. was not done in the interests of
the English Government. Moreover, article 55 c of the
Prize Code is a provision to be strictly interpreted one
which does not permit of application by analogy. In the
oral pleading before the superior prize court the claimants
also contended that unneutral service ' in the sense of.1ce.Unneutral servarticle 55 of the Prize Code, could only be assumed if the
service to the enemy was voluntary. Such was not the
case here, however, because the claimant had been compelled to conclude the charter, for only under this condition was their ship released by the English. The imperial commissioner before the superior prize court
denied this contention, and asked that the appeal be
rejected.
This petition should be gran ted.
The judge of the lower court pronounced the condemnation of the vessel in accordance 'vith article 55 c of
the Prize Code, the relevant version of which reads as
follo,vs:
"A neutral ship renders unneutral service to the
enemy if it is chartered by the enemy government."
rrherefore, the question next presents itself 'vhether
in the present case chartering by the enemy government
can be regarded as proved. 'fhe superior prize court
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does not hesitate to affirm this in common \vith the
judge of first instance. According to official information
of. the German Admiralty staff, the English firm, Furness,
Withy & Co., who concluded the contract of charter
Gov· with the claimant, is notoriously an agent of the English
Government. There is no ground for doubting the
accuracy of this information; it is, moreover, substantiated by other circumstances. The contract between the claimant and the above-named firm \vas
concluded after the English Government had already
compelled the ship to sail for six months on her account
under the English flag. That this in itself involved
service for the English Government is evidenced by the
entry in Lloyd's Shipping Register, 1916-17-mentioned by the judge of first instance-where against the
name of the vessel is noted: "Requisitioned by the .
Admiralty." Only upon an engagement to charter the
vessel for a considerable time to an English ~.rm \Vas the
English Government prevailed upon to give up the ship
to its owners. The presumption that in reality this
charter was only a mode of continuing the previous
service on behalf of the English Government is therefore
not refuted. In addition to this, the charter was entered into principally for trips to France and Italy.
Since the English Government, as is well kno,vn, has
undertaken to supply these countries with all the necessities of war, especially with coal, it goes without saying
that the English Government had an especial interest in
the acquisition of tonnage for this service. The contentions of the claimant tending to prove that, contrary
to the assumption of the judge of first instance, in the
fall of 1916 there was as yet no lack of cargo space in
England, are not pertinent. Otherwise, charter rate of
£8,055 a month, or about 2,000,000 marks a year, for a
ship of 3,208 gross registered tonnage, for \vhich a purchase price of some 300,000 marks was paid in 1914,
would be utterly inexplicable.
Such being the state of affairs, one can not but agree
\Vith the prize court in its assumption that the steamer
Island was chartered by the English Government. That
t.he contract was not concluded through an official organ
of the Government, or in its name, is of no consequence.
According to the sense and the purpose of the provision
,)f the Prize Code, it is sufficient ·that the charter \Vas
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entered into for the account of and in the interests of an
enemy government.
The second plea of the claimant is to the effect that
article 55 c of the Prize Code could have no application
because at the time of capture the ship 'vas not yet
sub]. ect to the terms of the charter, for the latter, accord- torce
Entefrinhg t into
o c ar er.
ing to sections 1 and 26 of the original text of the contract-presented in the court of second instance-was
only to come into force upon the delivery of the ship
ready for loading in a port on the east coast of England.
This is correct to the extent that certainly from the
point of view of private la\v the charter had not yet
begun to run; that is to say, that the obligations of the
firm of Furness, vVithy & Co. toward the claimant only
began at the time mentioned. This civil la\v point of
view, however, can not be decisive here. On the contrary,
the matter stands thus: ~he sttip was engaged upon this
trip to England in order to fulfill the charter contract,
i. e., to place itself at the immediate disposition of the
charterer, arrived at the east coast of England. The
sole cause and purpose of the voyage was the fulfillment
of the contract, by which· the ship was thus bound to
undertake this voyage, too. What the decision would
be had the vessel been chartered for some future period,
and at the time of capture had been on a voyage in no
way connected therewith, an independent, harmless
carriage of freight, does not need to be discussed. In
this instance the case is different, and to it article 55 c
of the Prize Code must be applied. The pertinent section of the Prize Code concerns itself with direct unneutral service. The article mentioned deals specifically
with service rendered the enemy government by furnishing cargo space. The declared purpose of article 55 c is,
t~en, to prevent the increase of enemy tonnage through
the charter of neutral ships. Regarded from this point
of view, the unneutral service in the present instance had
already begun when the steame:r Island left in ballast for
England, there to fulfill the terms of the charter.
It is impossible to expect of a belligerent po\ver that it
should release a ship chartered to its enemy 'vhich had
fallen into its hands while on the way to assume the obligations of the charter, because in the private-lu\V sense
the charter contract had not yet begun to run. 'fhus
the conclusion of the judge of first instance is to be
assented to, even though his assu1nption that the charter
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contract was already running at the time of the arrest
of the Island proved incorrect in view of proofs produced
in the court of second instance.
Whereas, finally, the plaintiff contends that unneutral
service was not involved, because he was forced into the
contract with the English firm, that does not follow.
The superior prize court has already repeatedly taken a
position in the negative (cf. the Kiew) on the question
whether it is of importance that an act of which cognizance is taken in prize law be committed under the
influence of psychological compulsion. As it was considered in the last-mentioned decision sufficient proof of
enemy destination that the goods were on their way to
enemy territory, knowingly and intentionally-even if
under the influence of coercion-so, in this case, it must
suffice that the ship was chartered for the English Government, even if the conclusion of the contract may not
have resulted from a spontaneous decision of the owners.
Moreover, in this case, the chartering did represent the
desire of the owners. They could have declined to conclude the contract had they been willing to forego a
profit which was only to be attained by unneutral service.
As, therefore, the condemnation of the vessel was rightly
decreed by the judge of first instance, and therefore no
question of compensation for the plaintiff is at issue, at
the same time as the decision of the main point, the
further complaint of the plaintiff, against the evaluation
made by the judge of first instance, can be held to have
Condemnation been disposed of without opposition.
The judgment is
affirmed.
therefore affirn1ed; costs to be decided according to
section 37 of the prize court rules.
oi':

THE "DRAUPNER"
June 27, 1918
(2 Entscbeidungen des Oberprisengerichts in Berlin, 62)

In the prize matter concerning the N or,vegian steamer
Draupner, home port Bergen, the imperial superior prize
court in Berlin, in its session of June 27, 1918, decided:
On the appeal of the o"\vners the decree of February
22, 1918, of the imperial prize court in Hamburg is
altered to this extent: The destruction of the ship is
declared to have been illegal and hence the claim of the
owners to compensation is legitimate. For the deter-
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mination of the amount of the claim, the matter will be
remanded to the court of first instance. The decision
concerning the costs of the O\vners' appeal is reserved.
The appeal of the War Risk Insurance Co. for Norwegian
Ships is dismissed with costs.
Reasons:
On November 30, 1916, the :Norwegian steamer tb~tr~~~~ent of
Draupne1'', in ballast from St. N azaire to Cardiff, \Vas
brought to by a German submarine and destroyed. The
ship '.Vas tirne chartered to the_ French coal firm, Com- Charter.
pagnie de Charbons de Blanzy et de l'Ouest, in Nantes.
The charter dated fron1 August 7, 1915, and was repeatedly extended, the last time on August 9, 1.916, until
the end of January, 1917. Under the charter, the ship
had been employed exclusively in the coal transportation
service between England and France, and was at the
time when it was sunk returning from such a voyage to
reload in England. According to the official report,
destruction ensued because, although ostensibly the ship
was chartered by a private firm, in reality this firm was
only a go-between for the English Government, which
had secured complete disposition of the vessel in order
to make use of it in fulfilling its obligation to deliver coal
to France. The private firm served only to veil the
real facts, in order to circumvent the provisions of article
55 c of the Prize Code.
,...,h
·
· 1 ·
· H amb urg h eld t h e d estruc- Hamburg
Judgmentprize
of
.1. e Imperia prize court Ill
tion of the ship valid and dismissed the claim of the court.
owners on account of the vessel, as well as that of the
War Risk Insurance Co. for N or,vegian Ships on account
of the effects and wages of the crew. The decision is
based upon article 55 c of the Prize Code, according to
which unneutral service exists if the vessel is chartered
by an enemy government. It is notorious, so it \Vas
declared, that England had obligated herself to supply
coal to France and Italy, and it is well known that without permission of the authorities in England no ves.sel
may clear from an English port. Ho\V important a part
coal plays in the present war needs no further elucidation.
Even if it was effected between private firms on both
sides, the supply of coal to France and Italy could only
take place with the consent of the English Government,
which, with every load, so far acquitted itself of the
obligation it had assumed. All this \Vas likewise kno\vn
to and desired by the neutral O\vners, \vho, by corrections
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in the original draft of the charter, had expressly revealed
themselves privy to the fact that goods "\Vere to be
included in the cargo which would lay the vessel open to
seizure by the German forces. For such a situation the
provisions of article 55 c of the Prize Code seem to have
been made. During a war it is not likely that an enemy
government will itself charter a vessel. They 'vill,
rather, employ private individuals for that, as was customary even before the London conference in the RussoJ apanese War, as regards the relations between the
L~~~~~ation orRussian Government and German shipo"\vners. Therefore, under "chartering," in article 46 of the Declaration
of Londo.n, to which article 55 c of the Prize Code conforms, reference can not be made only to the instances
when the government appears itself as the charterer,
but to all cases where the ship is placed at the disposal
of the enemy government by means of the charter party,
and the neutral owner knew and intended this.
The appeal 'of the owners entered against this decision
appears to be well founded.
The claimants appeal in the first place to article 112
of the Prize Code. They contended, and in this court
have again reverted to the contention that, according
Destruction or to article 112, section 2, the destruction of a neutral ship
neutral vesseh for unneu tral service might only be effected if certainty
existed that the fact could be proved before the prize
court, and hence, that if the evidence which the ship's
officer had at his command left room for doubt, the
destruction must be held illegal and the claim for compensation allowed, even if later in the proceedings before
the prize court, the fact of unneutral service was proved.
· The prize court was right in rejecting that contention.
It requires no further argument that the Prize Code
could not have intended any such contradictory provision.
Article 112, section 2, of the Prize Code is not ambiguous.
Its sole purpose is to keep before the mind of the commander what important consequences his decision may
have, and "\vhat he must keep especially in view before
he proceeds with the destruction. The judge of the
Oontinuousfirst instance also raises the question whether the voyage
voyage.
·
l ve a continuous
.
of t h e s h'1p d oes not 1nvo
voyage "\Vh ereb y
the trip in ballast would be part of the carriage of the
coal. He leaves it undecided "\vhether even in this case
the capture, and the final destruction, can not be justified. Ho,vever, the suggestion must be thrown out.
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For even if one wishes to regard it from the point of
view of carriage of contraband, one would be forced
to admit that capture can no more take place on the
ground of a complete carriage than on the ground of one
merely contemplated but not yet begun. Therefore,
only the actual stipuiations of article 55 c come under 0 ~;!!~~ 5~~i~e 1
consideration. The provision required-in the form in Code,
'vhich it applied at the time the ship was captured-that
the vessel be chartered by the enemy government.
That in the meantime the law has been changed so that
it suffices for the vessel to have undertaken the voyage in
the interest of the enemy's conduct of the war, can not
be regarded by the prize court, which incidentally draws
no inferences from the fact, as a merely interpretive
explanation. On the contrary, a new and essentially
more comprehensive provision is established along with
the former. Moreover, it must be observed that, so
far as concerns the original version, which corresponds
"rith the Declaration of London, the definite limitation
of the general notion which is to be found also in section
c is to be referred to the instigation of the German representative at London. Just on this point he opposed the
more general and elastic wording of the proposition of
the English. Nor can anything be concluded from that
fact that the English text of the Declaration of London,
instead of speaking of "chartered" vessels, speaks of
those in the "employment" of the government. The
French is the official text, and the more elastic expression
of the English translation is to be referred to it for its
true meaning.
At all events, it is correct to say that it makes no
difference whether the government be named in the
charter as a party to the contract, "'~hether the former
be drawn up in '\Vriting or agreed to by 'vord of mouth.
On that principle the superior prize court has already
rendered a decision-the Island. Other,vise the provision wrould be meaningless in practice. For there is
nothing easier than to find private concerns "~ho are ready
to enter, ostensibly as contractants, into a charter party
'vhich is really being concluded for the government. It
must suffice that the vessel be placed at the disposition
of the government as fully as if it had itself chartered
her.
So far the reasoning of the decision fron1 'vhich appeal
is taken may be followed. On the other hand, there is
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no ground for the assumption that the circumstances
of the present case correspond with the fundamental
requirement.
Deliveries
of
It IS,
· 0 f COUrse, We11 k no\\-n th a t th e E ngI"IS h G OVerncoal
to France
and Italy.
merit has pledged itself to deliver stipulated quantities
of coal to France and Italy. From this it may at once
be concluded that the supply of this coal is dependent
upon an extensive control on the part of the English
Government. But contract of this sort may be exercised
v1ithout the Government necessarily taking the exportations directly into its o\vn hands. There is no support
for the contention that one had entered into the execution of a Government operation in England on this
behalf. When it is reported that in the countries of
destination-France and Italy-comrnittees ,,-ere to
be for1ned to distribute the necessary amount of coal in
the different districts, and like,vise in England committees to insure the equal distribution of the orders;
if, moreover, fixed prices for the coal and fixed maximum
rates for the freight \Vere established; \vhen, furthermore, the English Government reserves to itself the
sanction of every single charter party to be conclude~
with a Norwegian shipowner, that all tends to prove
that in regard to the supply of coal to France and Italy,
the free traffic of the open freight market, even if strictly
controlled and more or less limited, is in no ·wise excluded,
and that the conveyance of the coal was not accomplished directly by the Government itself. Moreover,
it must be considered that the present case concerns
itself with a charter agreement "rith \vhich no English
firm was concerned at all, one which, on the contrary,
'vas concluded directly between the French importer
and the Norwegian shipovrner.
It is not denied that our interests in the conduct of
the \Var demanded that we combat this coal transportation by all the means at our disposal. The proposition
that wars are only carried on against the military forces
of the States involved in war no longer holds to-day·
At all events, it does not hold of the present 'var, upon
which the stamp of the English method of conducting
\var has been more and lnore impressed. In addition to
the direct employmen.t of armed forces, all possible
means of \Veakening the economic life . of the enemy
countries are employed as 1neasures of \Var, and, to that
extent, one is "rarranted in saying that every ship taking
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coal to France or Italy is opposing the purpose of our
conduct of the "rar and supporting that of our enemy.
The application of this theory to the administration of
justice finds its limits at the point where positive legal
axio1ns are encountere~. On these and their observance
the neutral must be able to rely, if faith in la\v and
justice is not to be deceived and shattered. Even if
the greater severity which the Prize Code assumed
by the ne\V version of article 55 c was vvarrantable, it
still remains true that it can not be applied to a time at
\Yhich it \Vas not yet in force.
Thus the detention of the vessel is proved unjustifiable,
and the appeal of the o\vner succeeds.
.
f h .
Claim
0 n t h e oth er h an d , t l1e cl aim o t e Insurance company surance
for \vages and effects of the crew \Vas correctly denied. pany.
In the first place, it is insufficiently supported by the
claimants in that a policy has neither been presented
nor even an allegation set up as to who the insured is or
are, \vhose rights the claimant is prosecuting before the
prize court. The claiin on behalf of V{ages lost is further Wages.
opposed by the consideration that it is not clear what
wages are involved. If it is the vvages for the current
voyage and if, as is to be assumed by the statement of
the owners and from the claims asserted by them, the
freight was paid in advance, then the amount of the
\Vages \vill be made good from the compensation for the
freight, which amount the owners may on no account
retain for themselves. According to the assertion now
made by the claimant, which has been verified by documentary evidence, it must be borne in mind that, concerning the wages as well as the effects, it is not a question of real insurance and of indemnification for an actual
loss vvhich gives the measure of the amount of damages.
On the contrary, the claims are made in virtue of a
la\V-\vhich \Vas unmistakably proinulgated to counteract
the aversion of sailors to service on board ship, which has
become very dangerous-to give to every member of the
cre"r, officers as well as men, a definite sum, figured in
round numbers, upon the loss of their vessel, 'vithout
regard to \Vhether wages and effects had actually been
lost, and if so, to what extent.
Compensation for such performances can certainly not
be demanded. Granted that the capturing State is
bound according to prize la\v to make compensation for
damages, it only has to compensate for losses 'vhieh have

of
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actually occurred. But there can not be included in
that the expenses that a third party-here, the Stategrants to those who '\Vere involved in the affair, without
regard to whether damages have occurred or not and
ho'\V high they run.
Therefore the judgment is affir~ed.

THE ''ESPERANZA''

June 27, 1918
(2 Entscheidungen des Oberprisengerichts in Berlin, 169)

In the prize matter concerning the Norwegian steamer
Esperanza, home port Tonsberg, the imperial superior
prize court in Berlin in its session of June 27, 1918r
decided:
The appeal against the judgment of the imperial prize
court in Hamburg of February 22, 1918, is dismissed with
costs.
Reasons:
fa~t.atement ot On January 15, 1917, theN orwegian steamer Esperanza,.
in ballast from Spezia to Barry, was brought to and sunk
by a German submarine. The ship was chartered to the
firm of Furness, Withy & Co. for 12 months under date of
February 4, 1916, and had carried coal to Italy. She
was on the return voyage to England to take on a nH\V
cargo of coal. Appeal is brought by the owners for the·
ship, equipment, and expenses of repatriating the crew
and by the War Risk Insurance Co. for N or'\vegian Ships
for the lost wages and effects of the crew.
Decision.of
The imperial prize court in Hamburg held that the
Hamburg pnze
court.
destruction of the ship was legal and dismissed the
claims. The ae~ision is based on article 55 c of the Prize
Code, according to which one is guilty of unneu tral service
if the vessel is chartered by an enemy government. It.
is notorious, so it '\Vas said, that England had assumed
supply of coal the obligation of delivering coal to Italy and France, and
to
· Is
· kn own t h at Wit
· h out permission
· · of t 11e aut110ri· t'Ies Ill
·
lta1y.France and It
England no ship might leave an English harbor. What
an important role coal plays in the present '\Var does not
need to be expatiated upon. 'rhe supplying of coal to.
France and Italy, even if it '\Vas effected bet'\\reen private
concerns, could only take place '\Vith the permission of
the English Government, '\Vhich, 'vith each delivery,.
acquitted itself to that extent of the obligation it had
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assumed. The neutral owners kne'v and intended this,
for by corrections in the draft of the charter they explicitly declared that they understood that goods 'vere
to. form the cargo which 'vould lay the vessel open to
the danger of capture by the German forces. Such a
case is provided for by the provisions of article 55 c of
the Prize Code. It is unlikely in war that an enemy
goverpment should itself charter the vessel; it 'viii rather
employ private individuals for that, as v;as the custom
even before the London conference in the Jlusso-J apanese
War in the relations existing bet,veen the Russian Government and German shipowners. In article 46 of the
Declaration of London, to w,.hich article 55 c of the Prize Lg~~~~ation o·f
Code conforms, under the head of "chartering" reference must be made, not only to the case where the Government itself appears as charterer, but to all those
instances in 'vhich the vessel is at the disposal of the
enemey government and the neutral owners kno'v and
desire it.
'rhe appeal of the claimants entered against this judgment fails. In his conclusion the judge of first instance
must be upheld, even if the deductions in the grounds
for the decision can not ahvays be considered correct.
If at the time of capture article 55 c of the Prize Code a!~t~l~n55:iri~:
had already been in force in the form 'vhich it acquired Code.
by the ordinance of July 29, 1917, the decision 'vould be
rendered without further ado. For it is not contested
that the vessel was on a voyage from and to enemy territory and 'vas chartered by an enemy subject. One
Yrould have to assur.a.e, therefore-as the facts do not
gainsay the assumption, of 'vhich more later-that the
vessel had set sail "in the interests of the enemy's conduct of the 'var." But the la'v did not yet read thus when
the Esperanza 'vas destroyed, and the judge of first instance can not be concurred 'vith in assuming that the
supplementary la'v of July 29, 1917, did not add anything ne,v, but \\.,.as rather a commentary on the la'v
already in force. One n1ust not forget that article 55 c
of the Prize Code, like its prototype article 46 of the
Declaration of London, set itself the task of circumscribing the uncertain and vague conception of unneutral
service. When, under section c it is specified that the
ship be "chartered by the enemy government" one Chn rt or to..
.
. '
enemy governmay Indeed say that every vessel so chartered IS sailing mcnt.
in the interest of enemy conduct of the 'var. But it
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'\Von't do at all simply to transpose the sentence. On
the other hand, it is quite correct that it can make no
difference whether the enemy government is designated
in the contract of charter as the charterer, or "\Vhether
it appears at all as party to the contract. The provision 'Nould other'\vise be without practical significance,
for if an enemy government "\Vishes to secure for itself
the disposition of a merchant vessel, "\Vithout this. fact
appearing, nothing is easier than for it to employ a
go-bet\veen for .this purpose, who puts himself forw·ard
in place of the government in the role of charterer. In
the sense of the provision of the law it must suffice that
the government has in fact secured that control over
the vessel that it would have procured by a contract of
charter concluded directly with the ovlner.
In the cases of the Draupner, Asta, and Saga, decided
at the same time as the present case, where the capture
and destruction of the vessels took place under apparently similar circumstances, the court refused to affirm
the condemnation. Here, on the contrary, the particular circumstances lead to a contrary decision.
The Draupner and the Astra were chartered directly
by the Norwegian owners to French coal companies, who
were outside the immediate sphere of power of England,
and the Saga was admittedly chartered by an English
firm, but nothing was known of the latter's connection
with the Government. Moreover, this firm had subchartered the vessel to different firms for the current
and several previous voyages, and that not only for the
transport of coal. The Esperanza, on the other hand,
was leased to the firm of Furness, Withy & Co., in
London, whose relation to the English Government has
already come to the knowledge of the court in the prize
matter of the Island.
In that case, too, it "\Vas a neutral ship that "\Vas chartered by the above-n1entioned firm, and it "\Vas evident
from the accompanying circumstances that it "\Vas a
question only of the execution of a demand for the ship
made by the Government in this form. The relation of
this firm to the English Governn1ent, "\vhich can be
deduced from the above, is fully elucidated by an incident
in the English I-Iouse of Commons, of \vhich a report is
given in No. 1756 of "Fairplay" for April 5, 1917.
According to it, upon a question being raised in Parliament concerning ru1nors of excessive '\Var profits of ship-
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owners, and of the very firm in question, the latter was
protected by the Government representative.
He
explained that" during the period August, 1914, to March
15, 1917, many neutral vessels have been chartered by
Furness, Withy & Co. on behalf of His Majesty's Government;'' that the Government had never paid even a
commission to the firm. On the contrary, that even such
commission as they draw from foreign shipowners they
place to the credit of the Government and that the
Government is glad to seize the opportunity to express
its thanks to the company "for their ungrudging and
invaluable services." So in the present case, in the charter
concluded with the owners, Furness, Withy & Co. have
arranged for a commission of 272 per cent for themselves
as intermediary which, it is to be assumed from this
explanation of the English Government representative,
has also been placed to the credit of the English Government. Further light is shed upon the facts and law of
the case by the correspondence of the firm with the
captain, which was found among the ship's papers. It
was addressed to Palermo, and directed the captain to
deliver up his cargo to the Italian Government if the
consignee should not be on the spot, as they were covered
against claims for recovery which might be preferred by
the rightful possessors of the bills of lading. Accordingly,
the charterer was in a position to deliver his entire cargo
of coal to the Italian Government without regard to the
possessor of the bill of lading, a fact which shows unmistakably that on the English side as well it was a question
of a transaction of the . Government.
In view of all this, there can be no doubt that the
firm, Furness, Withy & Co., was only concerned in the
matter as an organ of the English Government, and
that the latter had the same power of disposition over
the vessel as if it had itself concluded the charter. According to what has been said above, the requirement
of article 55 c of the Prize Code seems to be fulfilled.
The vessel 'vas, therefore, legally captured, and as a
sequel destroyed.
The claimants rely upon article 112 of the Prize Destruction
•
neutral vessPls
Code. In the court of first Instance they con tended,
and have reverted to the contention in this court, tha.t
according to article 112, section 2, of the Prize Code,
the destruction of a neutral ship for unneutral service
33474-25t--7

or
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may only take place when certainty exists that the fact
can be proved before the prize court, and hence, if the
evidence at the command of the ship's officer still left
room for doubt, the destruction of the prize must be
declared illegal and indemnity allowed, even if in the
proceedings before the prize court the fact of unneutral
service is proved. The prize court was right in dismissing that contention. Article . 112, section 2, is not.
ambiguous. Its sole purpose is to remind the commander what serious consequences his decision may
have, and what he must especially aim at before proceeding to the destruction .
.So far as concerns the appeal of the War Risk Insurance Co. for Norwegian Ships on account of lost
property and wages of the crew, this appeal also fails if
for no other reason than that article 115 of the Prize
Code, upon which the claimant relies, only provides
indemnity for neutral cargo.
For these reasons, the judgment is affirmed.
THE "SYLVAN ARROW"
([1923], p. 220)

Syllabus.

Shipping-Collision-Ship under Government requisition-Officers
and crew servants of Government-Action in rem for collision
damage-Whether maritime lien attaches after ship released from
requisition.
While under requisition by, and manned and operated by, the
United States Government, the defendants~ steamship was in
collision with and did damage to the plaintiffs' steamship.
After the vessel had been released .from requisition the plaintiffs commenced an action in rem for their ~ollision damage.
In that action the defendants pleaded (inter alia) that "at
the time when the collision is alleged to have taken place the
Sylvan Arrow was under requisition by and under the sole
control and management of the Government of the United
States and was being navigated by persons who were the
servants of the said Government and for whose negligence
the defendants were and are in no wise responsible. * * *
The defendants say that the action is not maintainable in
rem by reason of the facts set out" above. On the hearing of
this question as a preliminary point of law:
Held, on the facts, that the defendants had surrendered their vessel to
the United States Government under compulsion, that in no
sense could it be said that the master and crew derived their
authority from the defendants, and that in the circumstances
no maritime lien attached to the vessel by reason of the collision and her owners were not, either through their vessel or
otherwise, liable .to the plaintiffs.
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Quaere, as to where an owner voluntarily places his vessel in the
possession and control of charterers or other persons, whether
The Lemington ([1874] 2 Asp. M. L. C. 475) was correctly
decided, having regard to the principles laid down in The
Parlement Belge ([1880] 5 P. D. 197, 218) and other cases.

Action of damage by collision.
The plaintiffs were the owners of the steamship W. · I.
Radcliffe.
The defendants were the owners of the steamship or
vessel Sylvan Arrow.
On December 1, 1918, a collision was alleged to have,&8Cststatement
•
taken place in New York Harbor between the plaintiffs'
steamship W. I. Radcl1jfe and the defendants' steamship
Sylvan Arrow. The Sylvan Arrow, a vessel owned by
the Standard Transportation Co., an American corporation, vvas at the time of the alleged collision admittedly
manned and operated by officers and men appointed by
the United States Navy Department, under a form of
requisition charter entered into between the owners and
the United States Government, pursuant to an order of
requisition dated December 29, 1917. On July 6, 1922,
after the Sylvan Arrow had been returned to her owners,
the owners of the W. I. Radcliffe commenced the present
action in rem against the Sylvan ...4rrow, and although the
two years allowed by the maritime conventions act, 1911,
for the commencement of actions had expired, they obtained the leave of the court to maintain their suit. By
their defense of that action the owners of the Sylvan
Arrow pleaded that they had no knowledge or information
of the alleged or any collision between the Sylvan Arrow
and the W. I. Radcliffe)· that "(2) alternatively if any
collision took place between the W. I. Radcl~tfe and
Sylvan Arrow, which the defendants do not admit, the
defendants deny that the collision and damage mentioned
in the statement of claim were caused or contributed to
by the alleged or any negligence on the part of themselves or their servants. At the time when the said collision is alleged to have taken place the Sylpan A rro117
was under requisition by and under the sole control and
management of the Government of the United States
and was being navigated by persons who were the servants
of the said Government and for whose negligence the
defendants were and are in no wise ·responsible. * * *
(4) The defendants say that the action is not maintainable
in rem by reason of the facts set out in paragraph 2.·
hereof.''
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The question of law so raised was argued as a preliminary point.
for
Raeburn, K. C., and Dumas for the defendants: All the
old cases dealing with this matter are to be found summarized in the judgment of Gorell Barnes, J., in The
Ripon Oity. 65 In every case where the owner has been
found liable for damage done by his ship while she was in
the possession and control of other persons it has been
because the owner has voluntarily parted "\vith the possession and control of the vessel to those other persons, and
those who have been guilty of the negligence must be
deemed to have derived their authority fron1 the owner.
The owner would be liable even if he had handed over the
vessel to charterers under a demise charter, which put it
out of his power to choose the master and crew, if he had
entered into the charter voluntarily. Here there was not
a voluntary surrender but a compulsory taking by the
United States Government. You can not imply the
owner's authority, and therefore no maritime lien attaches to the vessel and her owner is not liable.
for
Dunlop, K. C., and Ballock for the plaintiffs: The Documents establish that the notice of requisition was never
acted upon and that at the date of the collision, the Sylvan
Arrow was in the possession of the American Government
as charterers by demise, under a charter party dated
December 29, 1917, and an agreement made on July 15,
1918. It was from the charter party and agreement that
the American Government derived their authority and
not from the order of requisition. There is no evidence
that the Government had any power to compel the owners
to enter into the said charter party and agreement, or
that the vessel was handed over under any compulsion.
Instead of requisitioning the vessel the Government preferred to make a voluntary agreement for hire. It is none
the less voluntary because, if the defendants had not
agreed, the Government had power to take the vessel by
a totally different proceeding. There is no suggestion in
the defendants' affidavits that they entered into the
agreement because they had been served "\Vith a requisition order. All they say is that they entered into a
requisition charter, and for all the evidence to the contrary that charter may have been entered into at the
owners' request. The return of the vessel is not. a release
from a requisition order but a redelivery from a requi115

[1897] p . 226.
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sition charter. If- the owners have voluntarily given the
charterer the option of putting his own cre'v on board
and exercising sole control of the navigation, the crew are
deemed to have derived their authority from the owners
through the charter, and a maritime lien attaches to the
vessel for damage occasioned by the negligence of the
crew: See The Lemington/6 the judgment in which case
was approved by Gorell Barnes, J., in The Ripon Oity. 67
[They also referred to The Edwin 68 and The Tervaete. 69 ]
Raeburn, K. C., in reply: The chain of cases which include The Ticonderoga 70 ; The Lemington 66 ; The Tasmania 71 ; and The Ripon City 67 would seem to have
gro,vn up before it was fully appreciated that the liability
of the ship and the liability of the owner must march
together; see, moreover, The Parlement Belge 7 and The
Utopia. 72 The compulsion was to give up the possession
of the ship under the requisition order. The agreement
was merely as to the terms of the requisition.
July 16. HILL, J.: On December 1, 1918, the plaintiffs?
steamship, the W. I. Radcliffe, and the defendants'
steamship, the Sylvan Arrow, were in collision in New
York Harbor. The Sylvan Arrow was then, and still is,
owned by the defendants, the Standard Transportation
Co., a private corporation, registered under the laws of
the State of Delaware. It. is admitted, and clearly appears from the affidavits put in, that at the time of the
collision the master and crew of the Sylvan Arrow were
the servants not of the defendants but of the American
Government, appointed, employed, and controlled by
the Navy Department. The issue now to be determined
is whether, assuming the collision to have been caused
by the negligence of those in charge of the Sylvan Arrow,
any maritime lien attached to the Sylvan Arrow, and
whether by reason of such lien the defendants can be
proceeded against by writ in rem against the ship. The
defendants raise this question by paragraph 2 of the
defense: "The Sylvan Arrow 'vas under requisition by
and under the sole control and management of the Government of the United States and '\Vas being navigated by
persons \vho were the servants of the said Government
and for '\vhose negligence the defendants 'vcre and arc in
no,vise responsible." The plaintiffs argued that this did
7

5 P. D.l79.
2 Asp. M. L. C. 475.
67 [1897] p. 226.
6E (1864) Br. & Lush. 281.
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not truly represent the facts and that the facts should be
stated thus: "The Sylvan Arrow 'vas chartered by the
defendants as owners to the Government of the United
States under a charter party operating as a demise and
was therefore under the sole control and management of
the Government of the United States and was being navigated by persons who were servants of the said Government and for whose negligence the defendants were and
are in nowise personally responsible." The plaintiffs
contend that upon those facts the ship became subject
to a maritime lien, and that an action can be maintained
to enforce it. They rely, of course, upon The Lemington 66-a decision of Sir Robert Phillimore in 1874-and
the dicta in The Ticonderoga 73-Doctor Lushington, 1857
and The Tasmania 74 (Sir James Hannen, 1888) and The
Ripon City 67 (Gorell Barnes, J.). Some day, and probably by a higher court, The Lemington 66 and tho.se dicta
and the contrary dictum of Doctor Lushington in The
Druid 75 ;,vill have to be considered in the light of the
principles .so clearly laid down by the court of appeal
in The Parlement Belge 76 by the House of Lords in The
Gastlegate 77 and by the privy council in The Utopia. 78
The general principle is thus stated in The Utopia: 79
" The foundation of the lien is the negligence of the
owners or their servants at the time of the collision, and
if that be not proved no lien comes into existence, and
the ship is no more liable than any other property which
the owners at the time of collision may have possessed.
In the recent case of The Gastlegate 77 * * * language used by the present master of the rolls in The
Parlement Belge 76 which expresses the above vie,v, was
quoted with an approval which their lordships desire to
repeat." What Brett, L. J., said was: "Though the
ship has been in collision and has caused injury by reason
of the negligence or want of skill of those in charge of her,
yet she can not be made the means of compensation if
those in charge of her were not the servants of her then
owner, as if she was in charge of a compulsory pilot."
In The Gastlegate 77 Lord Watson stated the principle of
the maritime law to be that "inasmuch as every proceeding in rem is in substa_nce a proceeding agninst the
66
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[1893] A. C. 38, 52.
78 [1893] A. C. 492, 497, 499.
7o 2 Asp. M. L. C. 475, 478.
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owner of the ship a proper maritime lien must have its
root in his personal liability." He then refers to damage
actions (The Le1nington 66 and The Ticonderoga 73 had been
cited) and says; "It was argued that the case of lien for
damages by collision furnishes another exception to the
general rule, and there are decisions and dicta which
point in that direction; but these authorities are hardly
reconcilable with the judgment of Doctor Lushington in
The Dru.id 75 or with the law laid down by the court of
appeal in The Parlement Belge,1 '' and he then quotes
Brett, L. J. But it may be that for me, The Lemington/ 9
which is a direct decision, is the governing authority.
Let us see what the decision in that case and the dicta
in the other cases come to. If they are law, they make
an exception to the general rule. What precisely is the
exception~ In The Ticonderoga 80 the observations of ooihe
Doctor Lushington appear to me to be clearly obiter.
In that case it does not appear that the master and crew
were appointed or paid by the charterers-the French
Government-but only that the ship was under the orders
of the charterers, ''in the service of the French Government." In the course of his judgment he said: "I am
not aware, where there has been any proceeding in rem,
and the vessel so proceeded against has been clearly
guilty of damage, that any attempt has been made in
this court to deprive the party complaining of the right
he has by the maritime law of the world of proceeding
against the property itself. Supposing a vessel is chartered so that the owners have divested thelnselves, for a
pecuniary consideration, of all power, right, and authority over the vessel for a given time, and have left to the
charterers the appointment of the master and cre\v, and
suppose in that case the vessel had done damage, and
was proceeded against in this court-! will admit, for
the purposes of argument, that the charterers, and not
the owners, would be responsible elsewhere, although I
give no opinion upon that point-but still I should
here say to the parties who had received the damage,
that they had, by the maritime la'v of nations, a remedy
against the ship itself." Then he goes on to contrast the
case of a pilot by compulsion. 'I'he next case is Tlie
7 5 P. D. 197.
ee 2 Asp. M. L. C. 475.
73 ewa. 215.

75
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The Lemington.

Maritimelien.

Lemington,' 9 in which Sir Robert Phillimore said: "I
think the la'v was correct! y laid do,vn by Doctor Lushincrton * * * in the case of The Ticonderoga·" 73
b
'
and he went on: "A vessel placed by its real o'vners
wholly in the control of charterers or hirers, and employed
by the latter for the lawful purposes of the hiring, is held
by the charterers as pro hac vice owners.· Damage
'vrongfully done by the res whilst in possession of the
charterers is, therefore, damage done by the 'o'vners' or
their servants, although those owners may be only temporary. Vessels suffering damage from a chartered ship
are entitled prima facie to a maritime lien upon that ship,
and look to the res as security for restitution. I can not
see how the owners of the res can take away that security
by having -temporarily transferred the possession to
third parties. A maritime lien attaches to a ship for
damage done, through the negligence of those in charge
of her, in whosesoever possession she may be, if that
damage is inflicted by her whilst in the course of her
ordinary and la,vful employment, authorized by her
owners. Whether the damage is done through the default of the servants of the actual owners, or of the servants of the chartering owners, the res is equally responsible, provided that the servant making default is not
acting unlawfully, or out of the scope of his authority."
It will be observed that in both those cases-! am not
quite sure that it does not color much of the earlier judgments in this matter-the ship is spoken of as being "the
guilty party." The next case is The Tasmania, 81 in
which Sir James Hannen reviewed the cases; and in
The Ripon Oity 82 Gorell Barnes, J., expressed the
opinion that The Lemington 79 was rightly decided.
Speaking of The Parlement Belge, 7 and the dicta I have
referred to, he said: "I am convinced that the judges
did not intend to decide that in no circumstances can a
maritime lien be obtained unless the o'vners of the res
are personally liable in respect of the claim. It will be
found, in accordance with modern principles and authorities, that there are certain cases in 'vhich a maritime
lien may exist and be enforced against the property of
75
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persons not personally liable for the claim, and who are
not the persons 'vho, or whose servants, have required the
service or done the damage." A little later, speaking of
a maritime lien, he says: " This right must, therefore, in
some way have been derived from the owner either directly or through the acts of persons deriving their
authority from the owner." Then he considers the case
of a chartered ship: "The principle upon which o'vners
'vho have handed over the possession and control of a
vessel to charterers, and upon which mortgagees and
others interested in her 'vho have allowed the owners to
remain in possession are liable to have their property
takeq. to satisfy claims in respect of matters 'vhich give
rise to maritime liens, may, in my opinion, be deduced
from the general principles I have above stated and thus
expressed. As maritime liens are recognized by law,
persons who are allowed by those interested in a vessel to
have possession of her .for the purpose of using or employing her in the ordinary manner, must be deemed to have
received authority from those interested in her to subject the vessel to claims in respect of which maritime
liens may attach to her arising out of matters occurring
in the ordinary course of her use or employment, unless
the parties have so acted towards each other that the
party asserting the lien is not entitled to rely on such presumed authority. In my opinion, it is right in principle
and only reasonable, in order to secure prudent navigation, that third persons whose property is damaged by
negligence in the navigation of a vessel by those in charge
of her should not be deprived of the security of the vessel by arrangement between the persons interested in
her and those in possession of her. * * * The persons
in teres ted in a vessel in placing her in the possession and
control of other persons, to be used or employed in the
ordinary way, must contemplate that claims may arise
against her in respect of rights given by the maritime la,v,
and may be taken to have authorized those persons to
subject the vessel to those claims."
In these cases it will be seen that the liability of the
ship and of the owner through the ship is based upon the
fact that the negligent persons "derived their authority
from the owner" and that "the owner placed the ship
in the possession and control of other persons to be used
and employed in the ordinary way"; and that ''charterers in whom the control of the ship has been vested
33474-25t-8
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hy the owners are deemed to have derived their authority
from the owners so as to make the ship liable for the
negligence of the charterers who are pro hac vice owners.''
Let us see whether the United States Navy men in charge
of the Sylvan Arrow derived their authority from the
defendants-whether the defendants placed the Sylvan
Arrow in the possession and control of the United States
Government-whether the control of the ship was vested
by the defendants in the United States Government.
According to the affidavit of Mr. Ali sworn on October
12, 1922, paragraph 3, the Sylvan Arrow was requisitioned
by the United States Government in December, 1917,
and handed over under such requisition to the Navy
Department on July 15, 1918, and remained under· such
requisition until January 21, 1919. To the affidavit of
Mr. Morse (sworn on March 2, 1923) are exhibited the
requisition charter party, and it is sworn that from July
15, 1918, to January 21, 1919, the Sylvan Arrow was under
that portion of the exhibit which is designated the "bareboat" form. By an affidavit sworn in this action on
July 25, 1922, Mr. D. Radcliffe for the plaintiffs stated
that the plaintiffs were advised that the Sylvan Arrow
had been requisitioned by the United States Government
in December, 1917, and in the following July had been
taken over by the Navy Department, and was released
by the Navy Department early in 1919. It was upon
the strength of that affidavit that the plaintiffs obtained
leave to maintain the action, notwithstanding that more
than two years had elapsed from the date of the collision.
The requisition charter party exhibited is executed by the
defendants and by the director of operations for the
Requisition United States Shipping Board. It is headed: ''Requisicharter.
tion charter," and begins: "This requisition charter made
and coilcluded upon in the District of Columbia the 29th
day of December, 1917." It recites: "Whereas by
requisition order dated December 29, 1917, pursuant to
the urgent deficiency act of the 15th of June, 1917, and
the President's Executive order of the 11th July, 1917,
the United States has requisitioned the use of the steamship Sylvan Arrow * * * and whereas it is desired
* * * to fix the compensation which the United
States shall pay to the o'vner for the use of the steamship
so requisitioned and to define by agreement the rights
and duties of the United States and of the owner 'vith
respect to the operation of the vessel under the requisition * * *" No,v therefore it is agreed as follows:

REQUISIT'ION CHARTER

''First. The terms and conditions under which the vessel
is to be operated shall be those contained in the 'time
form' hereto annexed; provided, however, that at the time
of the requisition or at any time thereafter, on five days'
written notice, the United States may operate the vessel
under the terms and conditions contained in the 'bare
boat form' hereto annexed." The time form contemplates that the Government has taken possession of the
ship and delivers possession back to the owner for the
ov;ner to oper~te the ship for the Government; under
it the master and crew are the servants of the owner.
The bare-boat form contemplates that the ship shal
remain in the service of the United States under the
requisition order, and provides that the United States
shall man and operate the vessel. It is not quite clear,
but I was told that in December, 1917, the ship was still
in the builders' hands. From correspondence exhibited
it appears that by direction of the United States Shipping·
Control Committee she was handed over to the Navy
Department on July 15, 1918, and in the same month
notice was given that the Government would operate
the vessel under the "bare boat" form of charter. The
precise status of the shipping control co1nmittee does not
appear, but if it was not a branch of the United States
Shipping Board or of the United States Shipping Board
Emergency Fleet Corporation, the correspondence shows
that its acts were ratified by the corporation.
From all this I draw the conclusion that the ship was
in fact compulsorily surrended by the owners · to the
United States Government. I am the more certain of
this conclusion because the ship was an oil tanker. In
1917-18 any shipowner· who had a tanker free from
Government control could have become "rich beyond the
drealns of avarice." I see no reason why I should doubt
the affidavits or the documents which state that the ship
was requisitioned. It is said for the plaintiffs that no
requisition order has been produced or disclosed, and it
is suggested that in fact there was no order on December
29, 1917. Whether an order was actually made or not
does not seem to me to matter much. If the intention
to make an order 'vere intimated to the o'vner, it 'vould
be as effective a compulsion as if it 'vere actually dra,vn
up. The essential fact is that the O"\Vner entered into the
charter party because the United States Government had
po,ver to compel him to give possession of the ship to the
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Government. It was also said that the method adopted
en¥:~~c~~ <leflci· by the Government was not in strict compliance with the
urgent deficiency act, 1917. By section 1 (e) the President is given power (inter alia) to requisition, or take
over, the possession of * * * any ship now constructed or in the process of construction. By section 2
the President was given power to take immediate possession if his orders were not obeyed. By section 3 just
compensation was to be paid, to be determined by the
President, with a power to sue to persons dissatisfied
with the amount. By section 4 the President may
exercise the powers through such agency or agencies as he
shall determine. By Executive order the President delegated his powers to the United States Shipping Board
and the Emergency Fleet Corporation. It is said that
because the Government, instead of fixing the just com,pensation for the Sylvan Arrow, proceeded to enter into
a charter party with the owner defining the hire and the
other mutual obligations of the Government and the
owner, the element of compulsion disappeared and the
o'\vner must be treated as one who had voluntarily
chartered his ship to the Government. I can not agree.
Underlying the whole transaction was the compulsionthe fact that the Government had and '\Vould have
exercised the power to take possession of the ship whether
the owner consented or not, and also had power to operate the ship by its own servants if it so chose. I am not
in the least suggesting that in fact the Government did
not proceed in the precise '\Vay intended by the act; but,
supposing it did not, the plaintiffs' case is no better,
because if it exercised a compulsion illegally it exercised
compulsion; if it exercised it legally it exercised compulsion. If it was illegal the position '\Vould be
analogous to that of a ship which had been seized by
pirates, in which case it could not possibly be suggested
that the O'\Vner of the ship should, in form of procedure,
be responsible for the negligent navigation by the pirates.
Such being the position, it can not in any sense be said
that the master and crew of the Sylvan Arrow, '\Yho '\Vere
the servants of the United States Navy Department,
derived their authority froln the defendants, or that the
defendants placed the ship in the possession and control
of the Navy Departlnent, or that the control of the ship
was vested by the defendants in the Navy Department.

LIABILITY FOR COLLISION

Accepting the decision in The Lemington 83 and the dicta
in The Ticonderoga, 73 The Tasmania 81 and The Ripon
Oity 84 as sound law, the facts of the present case do not
come w-ithin them. Upon those facts I hold that no
lnaritune lien attached to the vessel by reason of the
eollision and that the defendants are not, either through
their vessel or otherwise, responsible to the plaintiffs for
the collision damage. There \vill be judgment for the
defendants, with costs.
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